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By the time she was eighteen, Amy Lively was drinking heavily.' At
age twenty-one, after two detoxification programs and in the midst of a
divorce, she was emotionally distraught and attempted suicide.2 Weeks
later, while attending an Alcoholics Anonymous/Narcotics Anonymous
(AA/NA) meeting, she met a man, Koby Desai.3 Lively found Desai
"supportive and responsive to her emotional needs",4 and later moved into
his apartment.5 Desai asked her to sell cocaine to a "friend"6 and, on two
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5 Id. at 1038-39. Lively said the relationship was sexual; Desai said it was not and that
Lively stayed in a separate bedroom. Id. at 1039.
6 Although Desai testified that Lively first raised the possibility of selling cocaine, id at
1039, nothing in the appellate decision suggests that he ever denied having requested that
Lively to sell to his "friend."
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occasions, she did. Unbeknownst to Lively, Desai was a confidential police
informant and the man to whom she sold cocaine was one of his supervising
officers. Desai had not targeted Lively for this operation based on any prior
suspicion of her-she had no criminal record-nor had he suspected
anyone at the AA/NA meeting he attended. As a court would later describe
it, he was there with police approval "trolling for targets.",7 Though Desai
at some point proposed marriage,8 the relationship soured when, as planned,
police arrested Lively and he testified against her. Lively was convicted of
cocaine delivery and sentenced to prison. The Washington Supreme Court
upheld the jury's decision to reject her claim of entrapment. 9
The entrapment defense is the principal means by which state and
federal courts regulate the government's use of undercover operations.
Where it applies, the defense exempts from criminal liability individuals
who were encouraged by an agent of the government to commit what would
otherwise be an offense. There are different formulations of the defense,
but the most common "subjective" test inquires whether the defendant is
"predisposed" to commit the charged offense. l Lively sought to disprove
predisposition by testifying that Desai raised the subject of selling cocaine
only after their relationship was serious and that he pestered her about it
repeatedly every day for two weeks.11 The Lively court sustained the jury's
decision to reject the defense because there was contrary evidence showing
predisposition: Desai testified that she first proposed the transaction and
that he did not need to pester her about it.12 Thus, it was a jury question.1 3
7 Id. at 1046.
8 Desai denied proposing marriage. Id. at 1039. Lively supported her contrary testimony
with three witnesses who said she and Desai spoke of their plans to marry. ld. at 1038. For
sentencing purposes the trial judge found that Desai had proposed marriage. Id, at 1043.
9 Id. at 1044.
1o See discussion infra Part I.
1l Id. at 1039. Unlike most states, Washington places on the defendant the burden of
proving entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 1043.
12 Id. at 1039. The trial judge did not believe Desai, finding for sentencing purposes that
he is "a clever, deceitful person" because he had passed thirty bad checks. Id. at 1043.
Desai also admitted at trial to lying repeatedly at a defense deposition, saying that he was
maintaining his cover and did not think he was under oath. Id. at 1039.
13 For those who read footnotes, a reward: Notwithstanding her loss on entrapment, the
Washington Supreme Court reversed her conviction on the ground that the undercover
operation violated her due process rights. Id. at 1049. It would be erroneous, however, to
view her victory as suggesting that courts rescue defendants whenever they disagree with a
jury's rejection of the defense. Winning a due process challenge in this setting is about as
likely as winning the lottery. The United States Supreme Court has never invalidated a
conviction from an undercover operation on that ground. Id. at 1049 (Durham, C.J.,
dissenting). Most courts hold out the possibility that an undercover operation could violate
due process, but only a few have ever used this route to invalidate a conviction. See PAUL
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No doubt, some readers react to these facts with outrage, seeing a sting
operation run amok, one presenting a strong case for judicial intervention.
Many criminal law scholars would cite Lively as yet another reason to favor
the so-called "objective" test of entrapment that a few jurisdictions use. 14
Because that formulation focuses only on the nature of the police tactic and
not on the defendant's predisposition, Lively would probably have won
such a defense. Yet, in this article, I hope to do more than compare the
merits of one entrapment formulation to another. Until we know why we
should regulate these operations at all, we cannot hope to know what
doctrinal test is best.
Indeed, not everyone agrees that we should have any entrapment
defense. Almost twenty-five years ago, in one of the most penetrating
analyses of the doctrine, Michael Seidman declared that no judicial opinion
or commentator had provided a satisfactory justification for the defense. 15
Seidman contended that the doctrine lacks any normative basis and is,
indeed, incoherent except as a class privilege for those affluent enough to
avoid most criminal temptations.1 6  Illustrating the doctrine's apparent
incoherence, Seidman noted that some commentators condemn the
government for randomly selecting undercover targets while others
condemn the government for just the opposite: the deliberate, non-random
selection of targets.17  More recently, Paul Robinson and John Darley
questioned the defense, finding in their empirical work that the public
would prefer to use entrapment as a mitigation rather than a defense.' 8 In
MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE 277-326 (3d ed. 2002). Apparently, Lively was the
first such case in the Washington appellate courts. 921 P.2d at 1049 (Durham, C.J.,
dissenting). Some courts instead reject the possibility of such a defense. See United States
v. Tucker, 28 F.3d 1420 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Miller, 891 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir.
1989) (Easterbrook, J., concurring). Thus, despite Lively's federal constitutional victory, a
state entrapment defense remains the dominant legal regulation of undercover operations,
and her loss of that defense illustrates how minimal the regulation is.
14 See discussion infra Part 1.
15 Louis Michael Seidman, The Supreme Court, Entrapment, and Our Criminal Justice
Dilemma, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 111, 146-55.
16 See id. at 155 ("As the sanctions become stiffer, their application must also be
narrowed, because we are increasingly unwilling to risk imposition of such draconian
measures against ourselves or people like us.").
17 See Louis Michael Seidman, ABSCAM and the Constitution, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1199
(1985) (reviewing ABSCAM ETHICS: MORAL ISSUES AND DECEPTION IN LAW ENFORCEMENT
(Gerard Caplan ed., 1983)). He contrasts Mark Moore's claim that efficient law enforcement
requires having some suspicion of a person before targeting him for an undercover operation
with Lawrence Sherman's claim that equitable law enforcement would give everyone in a
group an equal chance of being targeted. Id. at 1200.




this article, I take these objections seriously and seek to determine whether
one can answer these critics by identifying an analytically sound rationale
for regulating undercover operations.
The controversy over entrapment is more important today than ever.
First, the United States exports the tactic of undercover operations and the
idea that judges should regulate them. When Seidman wrote, he cast doubt
on the doctrine by noting that "the rest of civilized world manages to
survive quite well without an entrapment defense."' 9  True enough, but
twenty-five years ago, most liberal democracies were so skeptical of
undercover operations-particularly the idea that police may commit
criminal acts as part of such operations-that there was not much need for a
defense. 0 Over time, however, the United States persuaded other nations to
use the tactic more aggressively, usually as part of international drug
enforcement. 21 After accommodating American demands, several nations
have embraced the need to regulate undercover operations judicially. These
nations recognize not a criminal "defense" but the judicial power to stay
prosecutions or exclude evidence as a remedy to unlawful operations.
22
Whatever the regulatory form, the initial normative question is whether
there is a rationale for any judicial regulation of these tactics. The
globalization of undercover operations heightens the importance of
identifying any such rationale.
19 Seidman, supra note 15, at 112 n.4; see also ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 18, at
147 ("The entrapment defense is almost unique to the United States .... ").
20 Some nations do not formally exempt police agents from criminal liability for
committing criminal acts as part of undercover operations. For example, in Ridgeway v. The
Queen, (1995) t84 C.L.R 19, 36-40, 43 (Austl.), the High Court of Australia refused to adopt
an entrapment defense, but excluded all evidence from the undercover operation because the
police had themselves committed the crime of importing heroin. See generally Jacqueline E.
Ross, Impediments to Transnational Cooperation in Undercover Policing. A Comparative
Study of the United States and Italy, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 569 (2004); Jacqueline E. Ross,
Dilemmas of Undercover Policing in Germany: The Troubled Quest for Legitimacy (2005)
(unpublished manuscript on file with author) [hereinafter Ross, Dilemmas of Undercover
Policing].
21 This point is a persistent theme in the contributions to UNDERCOVER: POLICE
SURVEILLANCE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Gary T. Marx & C. Fijnaut eds., 1995),
concerning the nations of France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, the United Kingdom,
Iceland, Sweden, and Canada.
22 See, e.g., Ridgeway, 184 C.L.R. at 43 (exercising judicial power to exclude evidence);
Mack v. The Queen, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 903, 905 (Can.) (recognizing power to stay
proceedings); Police v. Lavalle, [1979] 1 N.Z.L.R. 45 (C.A.) (recognizing power to exclude
evidence); Regina v. Loosely [2001] UKHL 53, [2001] 1 W.L.R. 2060 (U.K.), available at
2001 WL 1171942 (recognizing power to stay prosecution). Indeed, the European Court of
Justice has held that Article 6 of the European Convention restricts the use of undercover
agents. See Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-IV.
Teixeira de Castro prompted the English House of Lords to make new law in Ridgeway.
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In addition, American law enforcement is now in the process of
deploying its most aggressive undercover tactics to combat terrorism. 23 For
example, one of the more zealous techniques is to use the target as a
"conduit" or "middleman" between two government agents, as where a
confidential informant supplies the target the contraband that he then sells
24to an undercover agent. Recently, the federal government used this tactic
to obtain its highly touted terrorism conviction of Hemant Lakhani.25 After
Lakhani failed for a year to acquire the weapons he agreed to sell to an
undercover agent, the F.B.I. had Russian undercover operatives make the
sale to him. 26 Thus, as the law enforcement war on terror gains momentum,
there is every reason to expect it to fund a new round of aggressive
undercover operations. It is then all the more important to understand the
normative basis, if any, for regulating these operations.
Critics might claim that the best regulation is to completely prohibit
the tactic. Despite conventional wisdom, the case for prohibition is not
trivial. Sting operations involve the government deceiving citizens for the
purpose of encouraging them to commit crime. One may object in principle
to the government's use of deception, its encouraging crime, or its use of
deception for the purpose of encouraging crime. Even if certain
circumstances justify permitting this governmental deception, recent
scandals demonstrate in astonishing fashion how difficult it is to limit
deception to those circumstances. In Boston, it recently came to light that
23 See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau, Trying to Thwart Possible Terrorists Quickly, F.B.L Agents
Are Often Playing Them, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2005, at A10.
24 See, e.g., United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083 (5th Cir. 1975); Tanner v. State, 566
So. 2d 1246 (Miss. 1990); cf United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973) (rejecting
defense where government agent supplied difficult-to-obtain essential ingredients of the
drugs the target then manufactured and sold to the agent).
25 President Bush stated the case is "a pretty good example of what we're doing in order
to protect the American people." Petra Bartosiewicz, LO. U. One Terrorist, HARPER'S MAG.,
Aug. 2005, at 48, 48.
26 Id. at 48-49. Lakhani, a sixty-nine-year-old British businessman of Indian descent,
agreed to sell missiles and a launcher to an agent posing as a terrorist interested in shooting
down American passenger planes. Previously, Lakhani had mostly sold clothing, but was
involved in one lawful arms sale of armored personnel carriers to Angola. In the sting,
whenever the covert agent asked about a particular weapon, including a submarine, Lakhani
claimed to be able to provide it. Yet there was no evidence that Lakhani had access to these
weapons. See id.; Amy Klein, Missile Seller Guilty ofAiding Terrorism, N.J. RECORD, Apr.
28, 2005, at AI. When asked if Lakhani would have ever been able to buy missiles on his
own, U.S. Attorney Christopher J. Christie admitted he didn't know and commented, "There
are good people and bad people. Bad people do bad things. Bad people have to be
punished." This American Life: The Arms Trader (Chicago Public Radio July 8, 2005).
Lakhani was sentenced to forty-seven years in prison. John Sullivan, British Businessman
Sentenced in Terror Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2005, at B6.
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F.B.I. agents protected a confidential informant by hiding his involvement
in a murder and allowing innocent individuals to serve decades in prison for
the crime.2 7 In Tulia, Texas, a confidential informant fabricated undercover
drug crimes that led to the arrest of 12% of the black population, with a
substantial number sent to prison.28
Aside from scandals, undercover operations impose significant costs.
A partial list includes the undermining of trust in a society permeated by
police spies, 29 the corrupting influence that portraying criminals has on the
police agents who carry it out, 30 the potential for violence erupting out of
efforts to foment crime,3 the exploitative recruiting of vulnerable
27 See J.M. Lawrence, Mass. Pols Back Sweeping Probe of FBI-Mob Link, BOSTON
HERALD, Apr. 6, 2001, at 1; Limone v. United States, 336 F. Supp. 2d 18, 23-27 (D. Mass.
2004). In 1968, four men received life sentences for the 1965 murder of Deegan. Two died
in prison. In 2000, newly released F.B.I. documents showed that two F.B.I. agents had
known of the threat to kill Deegan weeks in advance but never warned him, that these
agents' confidential informants posed the threat and committed the crime, and that the agents
helped to conceal the truth to protect the informants. In 2001, a court vacated the
convictions of the surviving defendants. The District Attorney declined to retry them.
Associated Press, Dead Inmate Exonerated In a Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2004, at A24.
For a related scandal, see Shelley Murphy, Former Mob Boss Tells of Access to FBI,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 13, 2004, at B5.
28 See Jim Yardley, The Heat Is on a Texas Town After the Arrests of 40 Blacks, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 7, 2000, at Al. Of the forty-three defendants prosecuted as a result of the sting
operation, forty were black, though blacks constitute less than 10% of Tulia's population.
Id. After jury convictions or guilty pleas, twenty-two were sent to prison and others received
probation. Id. The informant, Coleman, had been trained by the Drug Enforcement Agency,
id., and was named Texas Lawman of the Year in 1999. Adam Liptak, $5 Million Settlement
Ends Case of Tainted Texas Sting, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2004, at A14. But Coleman was
subsequently discredited and convicted of peijury for some of his testimony in these matters,
prosecutors moved to overturn the drug convictions, the Texas Governor pardoned most of
those convicted, and they later settled a civil suit for $5 million. Id.
29 See GARY T. MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 222-29 (1988);
Sanford Levinson, Under Cover: The Hidden Costs of Infiltration, in ABSCAM ETHICS:
MORAL ISSUES AND DECEPTION IN LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 17, at 43.
30 See MARX, supra note 29, at 159-72. Ross calls this phenomenon-where undercover
agents are themselves seduced into criminality-the "Donnie Brasco" problem, after the case
memorialized in a 1997 film. Ross, Dilemmas of Undercover Policing, supra note 20.
31 In 2000, Manhattan police undercover agents approached Patrick Dorismond and a
friend and asked if they would sell marijuana. See William K. Rashbaum, Accounts Diverge
on What Led to Killing Outside Bar, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2000, at B6. Though the facts are
disputed, a scuffle broke out and the undercover agents' partner shot Dorismond to death,
though he was unarmed. Id. There are also "friendly fire" cases. See, e.g., Clifford Krauss,
Subway Chaos: Officer Firing at Officer, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1994, at Al (police shot
black undercover officer four times); Robert D. McFadden, Darkness and Disorder in
Subway: Questions Swirl in Police Shooting, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1992, at A1 (police shot
black undercover officer in the throat).
[Vol. 96
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENTRAPMENT
individuals into the dangerous life of a confidential informant,32 and the
public's loss of respect for state agents who engage in deception, betrayal,
and the exploitation of human weakness.33 One might particularly doubt
the benefit of undercover operations if one questions, rather than assumes,
the value of the prohibitions these operations seek to enforce. Undercover
operations are frequently used to enforce "victimless" criminal
prohibitions-particularly drug offenses-that are themselves contestable.
Notwithstanding these many concerns, in this article, I assume that we
should not ban all "proactive" undercover operations. By proactive, I mean
operations that exceed infiltration and observation and involve government
agents covertly manipulating the appearance of criminal opportunities.
Such agents manufacture criminal opportunities either by pretending to be a
criminal confederate who encourages a crime or by pretending to be a
potential victim who offers an easy target. The former operations are often
called "stings" and the latter "decoys." I assume that we should not ban all
such operations because their benefits sometimes justify their costs. 3 4
I make this assumption for two reasons. First, I believe it is true.
Particularly for crimes of bribery and terrorism, where the stakes are high
and conventional methods appear least effective, it seems that the benefits
of this investigative tool justify some use of it.35 But, I readily admit that I
do not have a decisive argument to convince skeptics, even for these
crimes. A second reason is relevance. Covert operations will undoubtedly
persist regardless of academic criticism, so an important issue is why and
how to regulate them.
Thus, I seek a justification for regulating undercover operations that is
consistent with the decision to permit them. The framing is important.
32 See, e.g., Lee Sinclair & David L. Herbert, The Use of Minors in Law Enforcement
Undercover Operations, 24 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 31 (1998); Dateline NBC: In Over His Head;
Mother of Murdered Teen-age Drug Informant Faults Police for Putting Her Son in Danger
(NBC television broadcast Oct. 12, 1998).
33 Among other issues, the public is sometimes shocked by the extent to which covert
agents preserve their cover by refusing to stop crimes. See, e.g., Gary T. Marx, Some
Reflections on Undercover: Recent Developments and Enduring Issues, 18 CRIME L. & Soc.
CHANGE 193, 201 (1992) (reporting example where agent stood by while infiltrated group
members committed rape).
34 Implicit is an additional preliminary assumption: that the benefits of passive
infiltration and observation exceed the costs-the chilling of trust and intimacy that are
essential to economic and personal relationships.
35 Part of my reasoning is that if we prohibited undercover operations, we would
undoubtedly encourage greater use of other tactics-covert surveillance, deceptive
interrogation, and coercion-that impose their own costs. See Jacqueline E. Ross, Book
Note, Tradeoffs in Undercover Investigations: A Comparative Perspective, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1501, 1508-12 (2002).
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Having discussed undercover operations with many people over the years, I
believe it is cognitively difficult to separate the decision to permit any such
operations from the narrower question of how to regulate the operations
once we've decided to permit them. Thus, it may be a residual doubt about
the unseemly deception and exploitation inherent in all proactive operations
that explains intuitions favoring a broad entrapment defense, rather than a
consistent theory for both permitting and regulating the operations. In this
article, I seek such a theory. I reject many arguments for limiting the tactic,
though I ultimately articulate a basis for significant regulation.
36
The article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the entrapment
defense. Part II critiques three possible justifications for the defense. The
first two claim that punishing the entrapped does not serve the purposes of
punishment, either retributive or utilitarian. The third proposes that the
general need for institutional "side constraints" on governmental power
includes the specific need for restrictions on undercover operations. Like
Seidman, I find the stated rationales inadequate.
Part III offers two new rationales for the defense. I do not claim that
there is some clever and wholly new theory. Instead, I reconstruct the
existing institutional and utilitarian analyses and find that they explain the
need for substantial regulation of undercover operations. Both arise
because of problems of agency, that is, because the interests of police and
prosecutors do not perfectly align with the public interest. I identify
precisely why the power to conduct undercover operations is so politically
threatening and why, absent regulation, police will use undercover
operations wastefully, diverting resources from better uses. The two
rationales allow us to answer Seidman's challenge-to explain why it is
troubling when government selects undercover targets either randomly or
deliberately. The analysis also reveals how existing formulations of the
defense fail to serve the purposes of the defense. Part IV explores the right
practical approach, asking what regulation best achieves the ends the theory
identifies. Here, I discuss the virtues of an entrapment defense tailored to
36 By narrowing the focus to one police tactic and excluding the option of prohibition, I
avoid certain interesting topics. First, I do not seek to identify the optimal set of police
tactics for investigating crime, i.e., the best combination of surveillance, interrogation,
coercion, and undercover work. In discussing covert operations, I take the constraints on
other tactics as given. Second, though my theory has broader implications, I focus on the
state's use of undercover operations in criminal prosecutions. Government also uses the
operations to seize property under forfeiture statutes, e.g., Zwak v. United States, 848 F.2d
1179 (11th Cir. 1988), and private citizens sting other private citizens, e.g., Rodgers v.
Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 733 N.E.2d 835 (I1. App. Ct. 2000) (employee sting).
Except for commenting on the "private entrapment defense," infra Part III.C., I ignore these
issues.
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each crime, and alternatively describe how to improve the conventional
one-size-fits-all entrapment defense.
I. THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE: AN OVERVIEW
In the United States, police at all levels of government make wide use
of proactive undercover operations as part of their efforts to control crime.
37
A great many of these operations are simple and short, exemplified by the
drug "buy and bust." When an individual replies to an offer to buy crack by
reaching into his pocket for the requested amount or taking the money and
pointing out the person holding the goods, there is no great controversy in
convicting him as a drug dealer. But as we will see, many stings are more
lengthy and elaborate, raising the possibility that they persuaded a law-
abiding citizen to make her first foray into crime. Decoy operations are
usually short, but often provide victims so tempting that they raise the same
possibility. A classic case is the police officer posing as an unconscious
inebriate with a wad of cash sticking out of his pocket.38 These cases raise
concern.
Although the Department of Justice regulates F.B.I. undercover
operations by administrative guidelines, 39  most jurisdictions leave
regulation entirely to the judiciary. A few other doctrines marginally affect
undercover operations,40 but entrapment is the main event. American courts
37 See MARX, supra note 29, at 1-15; Marx, supra note 33, at 193-98. Unfortunately, it is
not always easy to locate exact numbers. The DOJ Office of Inspector General recently
completed an audit of F.B.I. compliance with Attorney General Guidelines on undercover
operations, but information about the number of operations is redacted in the publicly
available report. See Office of Inspector Gen., Dep't of Justice, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATIVE GUIDELINES
147, 148 (Sept. 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0509/final.pdf
[hereinafter OIG's REPORT].
38 There is an interesting and long line of such decoy cases from Nevada: see Daniels v.
State, 110 P.3d 477 (2005); Miller v. State, 110 P.3d 53 (2005); DePasquale v. State, 757
P.2d 367 (1988); Sheriff v. Hawkins, 752 P.2d 769 (1988); Oliver v. State, 703 P.2d 869
(1985); Moreland v. State, 705 P.2d 160 (1985).
39 See MARX, supra note 29, at 180-88. The most recent version is The Attorney
General's Guidelines on Federal Bureau of Investigation Undercover Operations (May 30,
2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/fbiundercover.pdf [hereinafter AG Guidelines].
Under these guidelines, a Special Agent in Charge can make the findings necessary to
authorize ordinary undercover operations. Id. at 3-4. Operations involving certain "fiscal
circumstances" require approval by F.B.I. Headquarters. Id. at 5. Operations involving
certain "sensitive circumstances"-such as targeting government officials-require approval
by Headquarters and an Undercover Review Committee, which includes designated DOJ
Criminal Division attorneys. Id at 6-9.
40 The main alternative is Due Process, but while many courts say that it forbids
outrageous undercover operations, few reverse convictions on that basis. See MARCUS,
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started to recognize the need for such a defense in the late nineteenth
century.41 Even though most criminal enforcement occurs at the state level,
the United States Supreme Court's rulings are instructive because federal
officials took the lead in using undercover operations. When the Court took
its first undercover cases, involving postal officials, it upheld the
convictions.42 In 1932, the Court first recognized the defense in Sorrells v.
United States.43 During prohibition, a police agent posing as a tourist
gained Sorrells's trust by claiming to have served in the same military unit
as Sorrells did in the First World War. The agent then repeatedly asked
Sorrells to sell him liquor. Though he refused at first, Sorrells eventually
left and returned with liquor, which he sold to the agent. The Court held
that, on these facts, it was error not to submit the issue of an entrapment
defense to the jury.44
With the Supreme Court's lead, state courts and legislatures embraced
the entrapment defense.45 It is difficult to summarize the complex law
across American jurisdictions, but I offer a quick overview. Following
federal precedent, most jurisdictions recognize a subjective entrapment test,
which exculpates a defendant whose crime was (a) encouraged or "induced"
supra note 13, at 277-326. There is a separate Due Process doctrine loosely called
"entrapment" or "entrapment by estoppel," but it does not regulate undercover operations; it
bars conviction for an act after overt government officials inform the defendant that the act
does not constitute an offense. See, e.g., Raley v. State, 360 U.S. 423, 426 (1959) (rejecting
"an indefensible sort of entrapment by the state-convicting a citizen for exercising a
privilege which the state had clearly told him was available to him."). Also, once the state
initiates "formal adversary proceedings" against an individual, the Sixth Amendment
restricts the government's ability to "deliberately elicit" incriminating statements from her.
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-06 (1964). The doctrine requires a waiver of
the right to counsel, but covert agents cannot ask for a waiver without blowing their cover.
Nonetheless, the Sixth Amendment poses no such limits before formal proceedings begin;
passive listening does not count as deliberate elicitation, Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436,
459 (1986); and the rule is "offense specific," so it excludes deliberately elicited statements
only in a trial for the same offense for which formal proceedings had commenced against the
defendant when the statement was made, Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 164 (2001).
41 Possibly the first case is Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1915)
(immigration law). See Rebecca Roiphe, The Serpent Beguiled Me: A History of the
Entrapment Defense, 33 SETON HALL L. REv. 257 (2003).
42 See Goode v. United States, 159 U.S. 663, 673 (1895) (theft of mail); Grimm v. United
States, 156 U.S. 604, 611 (1895) (mailing obscene materials).
4' 287 U.S. 435, 452 (1932). The majority based the defense on statutory construction,
reasoning that Congress could not have intended its criminal prohibitions to reach the
behavior of entrapped defendants. Id. at 446.
44id.
45 The defense is now codified in twenty-six states. The statutes are collected in
MARCUS, supra note 13, at 705-15. In the remaining states, the defense is a judicial creation,
as it is in federal law.
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by the government, if (b) the defendant was not "predisposed" to commit
such crimes.4 6 "Inducement" and "predisposition" are murky concepts.
Inducement requires "something more" than creating a mere opportunity for
the defendant to commit the crime. "An 'inducement' consists of an
'opportunity' plus something else-typically, excessive pressure by the
government upon the defendant or the government's taking advantage of an
alternative, non-criminal type of motive." 47 The requirement of inducement
clearly forecloses the defense when the government agent infiltrates a group
and merely observes crime. But it also leaves open the possibility that
some manipulation of opportunities will fall short of entrapment because
the government's pressure was less than "excessive."
Undercover agents frequently encourage crime and the cases routinely
turn on predisposition. Courts often define predisposition to mean the
defendant was not reluctant to commit the crime. 8  A typical jury
instruction describes predisposition as being "ready and willing to violate
the law at the first opportunity."49 The Supreme Court's second entrapment
case, Sherman v. United States,5° provides an example. An undercover
agent posing as an addict first approached Sherman in a clinic treating
addiction and later begged him for help in obtaining drugs while feigning
symptoms of withdrawal. Sherman eventually relented, but the Court found
insufficient evidence of predisposition as a matter of law because Sherman
was reluctant to sell the drugs, gave in only because of concern for the
agent's pain of withdrawal (rather than profit; he sold at cost), and the
police found no narcotics in their subsequent search of his apartment.5 The
Court reached a similar conclusion in Jacobson v. United States,52 its last
word on entrapment. Undercover agents spent two years corresponding
with Jacobson about sex, sending him many letters advocating sexual
liberty with minors and the right to child pornography. When solicited,
Jacobson promptly ordered such pornography, but when police searched his
home, they found only the material they had sent him.5 3 Again, the Court
46 See id. at 51-63.
47 United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 961 (1st Cir. 1994), quoted with approval in
United States v. Poehlman, 217 F.3d 692, 701 (9th Cir. 2000).
48 See, e.g., United States v. Ulloa, 882 F.2d 41, 44 (2d Cir.1989).
49 United States v. Kelly, 748 F.2d 691, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
0 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
5' Id. at 375.
52 503 U.S. 540 (1992); see Gabriel J. Chin, The Story of Jacobson v. United States:
Catching Criminals or Creating Crime?, in CRIMINAL LAW STORIES (Robert Weisberg, ed.)
(forthcoming).
53 Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 540.
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found insufficient evidence of predisposition (prior to the government's
communications).54
By contrast, some American jurisdictions embrace an objective test for
entrapment, that dispenses with the issue of predisposition.55 Several adopt
the language of Model Penal Code § 2.13, which provides a defense to a
crime whenever the government's "methods of persuasion or
inducement ... create a substantial risk that such an offense will be
committed by persons other than those who are ready to commit it." Other
formulations refer to inducements that would persuade "an average" 56 or
"normally law-abiding ' '57 person to commit the crime. This standard aims
to exculpate defendants who were subject to certain unreasonable police
practices, without regard to their individual characteristics; that the
inducement would tempt someone not "ready to commit it" or a generally
law-abiding citizen condemns the practice even if the defendant is "ready to
commit it" and is not generally law-abiding. Conversely, the subjective test
aims to exculpate only "non-predisposed" actors whom the government
induced to commit crime; predisposed actors do not gain the defense
regardless of the strength of the government inducement.58
Commentators note that the objective and subjective tests are more
alike in practice than they first appear. 59 In practice, the more important
differences may be procedural. The jury decides application of the
subjective test, but frequently the judge resolves claims under the objective
test.60 Also, to prove predisposition, prosecutors may introduce otherwise
inadmissible evidence that the defendant possesses knowledge or abilities
useful only for committing the offense, has committed similar offenses or
acts in the past, or has a reputation for committing such offenses.6'
Substantively, the two tests can generate different outcomes. The most
obvious difference is that, when the inducement is strong but there is
14 Id. at 554.
55 The test was first suggested in minority opinions in Sorrells and Sherman. See
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453 (1932) (Roberts, Brandeis, and Stone, JJ.,
dissenting in part); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 378 (1958) (Frankfurter,
Douglas, Harlan, and Brennan, JJ., concurring in the result). About a dozen states employ an
objective test. See MARCUS, supra note 13, at 43.
56 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.450 (1962).
57 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-209 (1987).
58 A few jurisdictions use some kind of "hybrid" test combining subjective and objective
elements in different ways. See, e.g., State v. Rockhold, 476 A.2d 1236, 1239 (N.J. 1984)
(conjunctive test); Bacca v. State, 742 P.2d 1043 (N.M. 1987) (disjunctive test).
59 See, e.g., Seidman, supra note 15, at 120.
60 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 515-16 (4th ed. 2003).
61 Id. at 513-15.
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evidence of predisposition, as in Lively,62 a defendant might win an
entrapment defense under the objective test but lose under a subjective test.
The opposite case-losing the objective test but winning the subjective
test-is more difficult, but possible. At least in the subjective test
jurisdictions that frame the ultimate question as whether the defendant
would have offended if the government had left him alone, it is possible a
jury would find entrapment even though the government offer would not
have tempted an average citizen. In these jurisdictions, courts hold that
predisposition means not only willingness-the absence of reluctance-but
also "readiness"-being positioned to commit the offense. The primary
example is the money laundering case of United States v. Hollingsworth.
63
Though the defendants never exhibited reluctance to launder money, the
court found it unlikely that a genuine criminal would ever have proposed
such a transaction to the defendants, given their manifest inability to
launder money.64 Some courts reject this approach,65 but where readiness is
required and the temptation is modest, an "unready" defendant might win
the subjective version of the defense but lose an objective version.
II. JUSTIFYING THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE: A CRITIQUE OF EXISTING
THEORY
Criminal law theorists disagree about what rationale, if any, justifies
the entrapment defense. Part of the reason for confusion may be that
judicial opinions and scholarly articles are frequently distracted by issues
other than the fundamental justification for the defense, such as the concern
for whether courts should create such a defense without explicit legislative
authorization and the choice between competing doctrinal formulations. 66
But these issues are subordinate to the question of whether the defense or
other regulation is ultimately justified; moreover, it should be easier to
resolve subordinate issues if we have an appealing normative foundation for
62 State v. Lively, 921 P.2d 1035 (Wash. 1996).
63 27 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
64 Id. at 1202 ("Whatever it takes to become an international money launderer, they did
not have it."). Chief Judge Posner states that federal courts were in the process of reaching a
consensus that predisposed meant merely willingness (in contrast to reluctance) when the
Supreme Court decided Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992), which he interprets
as adding a "positional" element. See also United States v. Poehlman, 217 F.3d 692, 701
(9th Cir. 2000) (requiring readiness).
65 See, e.g., United States v. Thickstun, 110 F.3d 1349 (8th Cir. 1997) (rejecting
Hollingsworth 's interpretation of Jacobson).
66 1 do not discuss the question of whether courts should construct an entrapment defense
in the absence of a specific statute creating one. I do discuss the best formulation of an
entrapment defense, infra Part IV.
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the defense. In this Part, I consider and critique the literature that seeks to
justify the defense based on retributive theory, utilitarian theory, and
political/institutional concerns. In each case, I do not claim that there is no
possible way to use these approaches to justify the defense, only that no one
has yet successfully articulated such a theory.
Let me begin, however, by noting a consensus that exists about how to
describe the problem of entrapment. This consensus is only superficial, but
it is useful for framing the issue. Despite different normative starting
points, many courts and commentators make this common claim: The state
should not be allowed to punish an individual for committing a criminal act
in an undercover operation that she does not commit outside of undercover
operations. In other words, the government should not cause otherwise
law-abiding citizens to commit a crime and then punish them for it. I call
this point the "external offense principle" because it focuses on whether the
defendant commits the relevant sort of offense outside the undercover
operation.
Statements of the principle are found in most writing on entrapment.
In Sorrells v. United States, the Supreme Court stated that Congress did not
intend that its statutes would permit government officials to "instigat[e]...
an act on the part of persons otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its
commission and to punish them." 67 The "otherwise innocent" language
might be read in other ways,68 but I agree with Jonathan Carlson that
Sorrells here refers to the "core idea[] . . . that it is improper to impose
criminal sanctions upon a person who would not have engaged in criminal
conduct absent an effort by the government to induce such conduct., 69 In
Jacobson, the Court stated, "When the Government's quest for convictions
leads to the apprehension of an otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to
his own devices, likely would never have run afoul of the law, the courts
should intervene. 70
The external offense principle pervades scholarly commentary as well.
Many express the point in terms of causation, that the government should
be allowed to alter the timing of crimes so it can more easily detect them,
67 287 U.S. 435, 448 (1932).
68 The alternative is actual innocence in the sense of lacking the required mental state or
more broadly lacking blameworthiness. Both interpretations lead to confusion. First, I
explain at infra Part II.A why entrapped individuals are blameworthy. Second, if the mental
state were absent, that would be the grounds for defense, not entrapment.
69 Jonathan C. Carlson, The Act Requirement and the Foundations of the Entrapment
Defense, 73 VA. L. REV. 1011, 1051 (1987).
70 Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 553-54 (1992).
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but not to cause additional crimes.71 Gerald Dworkin explains, "The central
moral concern with pro-active law enforcement techniques is that they
manufacture or create crime in order that offenders be prosecuted and
punished., 72  Carlson agrees that "it is offensive for the government to
encourage, in order to prosecute, otherwise law-abiding persons. 73
Richard Posner says that undercover operations are not productive if "the
police offer [an actor] such inducements as would persuade him to commit
crimes that he would never commit in his ordinary environment., 74 Steve
Shavell concurs, "[I]f parties would not ordinarily commit criminal acts,
there is no behavior that needs to be deterred.,
75
In sum, theorists approaching entrapment from divergent perspectives
articulate a similar goal for the defense: to prevent government from using
undercover operations to convict an individual who does not otherwise
offend. But why not? Here the consensus dissolves. Those who think the
principle is justified disagree about whether the rationale is retributive,
utilitarian, or institutional. In this Part, I find the existing articulation of all
three rationales inadequate, except perhaps for justifying a "minimalist"
defense no one advocates. Ultimately, though I argue for a broad
entrapment defense in the next Part, I reject the validity of the external
offense principle.
A. RETRIBUTIVE THEORY: THE BLAMEWORTHINESS OF THE
ENTRAPPED
Under our current blaming practices, retributive theory is hard to
square with the entrapment defense. The entrapped individual is
71 See, e.g., J. Gregory Deis, Economics, Causation, and the Entrapment Defense, 2001
ILL. L. REV. 1207.
72 Gerald Dworkin, The Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat: Entrapment and the
Creation of Crime, 4 LAW & PHIL. 17, 24 (1985); see also id. at 27 ("[T]here is the danger
that one may not merely shift the scene of criminal activity but create crime that otherwise
would not have occurred.").
73 See Carlson, supra note 69, at 1051-52.
74 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 255 (5th ed. 1998) ("Police
inducements that merely affect the timing and not the level of criminal activity are socially
productive; those that induce a higher level of such activity are not."). Posner also makes
this point in judicial opinions. See United States v. Evans, 924 F.2d 714, 717 (7th Cir. 1991)
(noting the key is whether "the government's really having caused, in some rich sense, the
criminal activity to occur, as distinct from merely providing a convenient occasion for it to
occur."); United States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[I]f the inducement was
so great that it tempted the person to commit a crime that he would not otherwise have
committed, punishing him will not reduce the crime rate.").
75 Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a
Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1232, 1256 (1985).
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blameworthy because she voluntarily commits a wrongful act with the
requisite mental state. Viewing the entrapped as innocent implies that the
government's encouragement of crime excuses the undercover offender
from blame. Several commentators have pointed out the flaw in this
reasoning.76 We often blame and punish individuals for giving in to
temptations. In virtually any case of entrapment, we would blame the
defendant for giving in to exactly the same encouragement were it provided
by a sincere private individual (i.e., one not acting on behalf of
government).
Imagine two individuals each accept a bribe with the same degree of
initial reluctance and the same belief that they are selling their official
service to a sincere private buyer who has repeatedly offered an attractive
price. Suppose that the only difference in the two cases is that, while the
first bribe offeror is who he purports to be (a private citizen acting for his
own behalf), the second is an undercover government agent (a police officer
or informant working for the police). It is not clear how one can distinguish
the two cases on grounds of blameworthiness. The defendants (1) do the
same act with the same mental state, (2) in response to the same temptation
or encouragement. The only difference is the source of the bribe-
insincere government agent vs. sincere private individual. But there is no
reason why this difference matters to blameworthiness. From the entrapped
defendant's perspective, there was no difference in circumstance because
she believed the source was genuinely private, that is, identical to the
source for the other defendant.
If we cannot distinguish the two cases, then we must either blame both
defendants or neither. Standard practice rules out the latter. It is no defense
that one committed a crime that some private individual encouraged or
made seem particularly appealing." Indeed, we can see how
76 See Anthony M. Dillof, Unraveling Unlawful Entrapment, 94 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 827, 829-30, 845-46 (2004); Andrew Altman & Steven Lee, Legal
Entrapment, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 51, 59 (1982) ("[T]he rationale for the entrapment
defense cannot be the concern to distinguish between the culpable and the nonculpable.");
Carlson, supra note 69, at 1037-44; Christopher D. Moore, The Elusive Foundation of the
Entrapment Defense, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 1151 (1995) (arguing that the entrapment defense
does not satisfy the requirements of an excuse); Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses:
A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 199, 237-39 (1982); Seidman, supra note 15, at
129-36. Many judicial opinions make the same point. See, e.g., United States v. Russell,
411 U.S. 423, 442 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369,
380 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226, 229 (Alaska
1969).
7 The point I am making is that there is no defense to succumbing to a sincere private
request to commit a crime, no matter how tempting, nor to the presence of a genuinely
tempting victim. Though less relevant, it is also the case that there is no defense to
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unconventional this notion is by considering the closest available defense-
duress. Duress requires that the defendant succumb to a certain kind of
threat. The requirement of a threat rules out the defense for succumbing to
attractive offers. 8 Because we routinely blame individuals for failing to
refuse even the strongest non-threatening temptations to crime, there is then
no reason not to blame individuals who gave into such temptations merely
because they were, unknowingly, created by undercover agents.
It is, of course, possible that the "standard practice" is wrong. Many
individuals have a strong intuition that those lured into crime by unusual
situations presenting strong criminal temptations-Lively 7 9 for example-
deserve less punishment than those who succumb to weaker and more
ordinary temptations. Thus, it appears that temptation may mitigate
blame.80 If so, then there may come a point where the mitigation is so
extreme that it should provide a complete defense. Though plausible, this
retributive rationale would justify nothing like the current entrapment
defense because there are so few individuals whom we would completely
excuse from blame on this basis. Though we might not blame Lively, our
current practice would never exonerate Sorrells 81 or Jacobson 82 if a sincere
private party created the same criminal opportunity as the undercover agent
created in those cases. Only very rarely would a successful entrapment
claimant be beyond blame, given current practice.83 My goal is to
succumbing to an insincere private individual proposing a crime for the purpose of exposing
the recipient to criminal liability. This point is expressed by stating that "[t]here is no
defense of private entrapment." United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1203 (7th
Cir. 1994) (en banc); see also Holloway v. United States, 432 F.2d 775, 776 (10th Cir.
1970); Carbajal-Portillo v. United States, 396 F.2d 944, 948 (9th Cir. 1968); Grossman v.
State, 457 P.2d 226, 229 (Alaska 1969). Some scholars have argued for a private entrapment
defense. See LEO KATZ, BAD ACTS AND GUILTY MINDS 159 (1987); Ronald J. Allen, Melissa
Luttrell & Anne Kreeger, Clarifying Entrapment, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 407, 420-
21 (1999). I argue to the contrary infra at Part III.C.
78 See Seidman, supra note 15, at 13-34. On the conventional view, offers work to
expand the offeree's choices; threats contract choices. Dillof, supra note 76, at 849-52,
considers and rejects a rationale for the entrapment defense based on an analogy to duress.
79 See State v. Lively, 921 P.2d 1035, 1038 (Wash. 1996), discussed in the introduction.
80 See Joel Feinberg, Instigating the Unpredisposed: Bad Luck in Law and Life, in
MODALITY, MORALITY, AND BELIEF 152, 160 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, ed., 1995) ("[T]he
greater the amount of pressure required to move a person [to offend], the stronger must have
been her disposition not to commit the crime, and.., the stronger the disposition not to
perform the criminal act, the greater the mitigation of guilt for performing it at another
party's initiative.").
81 See 287 U.S. 435, 452 (1932), discussed in Part I.
82 See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992), discussed in Part I.
83 Note that ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 18, at 152-55, study public understandings
of blame and find more support for entrapment as a mitigation than a defense.
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determine whether a more-than-minimalist entrapment defense is consistent
with our other criminal law commitments. For the retributivist, it appears
the answer is no.
I should consider, however, the contrary argument of Roger Park. 4
Park claims that our practice of punishing those who give in to private
encouragements to crime does not prove that such individuals are
blameworthy. Instead, he says that we do not give a defense to non-
blameworthy individuals who give in to private temptation because of the
danger of contrived defenses. With a private temptation defense, one
member of a conspiracy could falsely but persuasively claim to have unduly
tempted the others, relieving them of liability and dramatically lowering the
expected punishment for group crimes.8 5 But, Park says, there is a far
smaller danger when government itself is the tempter because, by
controlling the situation, government can guarantee the acquisition of
evidence that proves whether or not the temptation was too great.
Again, I believe our existing commitments contradict Park's claim.
Poverty, peer pressure, and personal weakness are common reasons that
individuals fail to resist criminal temptations; the exploitation of personal
relationships is a routine part of conspiracies. To say that these
circumstances render individuals blameless suggests that we convict masses
of "innocent" individuals every day. Yet retributive theory requires blame
to justify punishment. To foreclose the private temptation defense
altogether for evidentiary reasons (rather than, say, shifting the burden of
proof) makes no more retributive sense than to eliminate insanity or self-
defense because they can occasionally be faked. In particular, members of
a conspiracy could fake a duress defense by claiming that one member
threatened the rest, but we deal with that problem with various limitations,
not by eliminating the defense entirely. The better explanation for the
absence of the temptation defense is that we actually do blame competent
adults who give in to such temptations (even if not as much as those who
were not so tempted).86 Similarly, we should blame the entrapped.87
84 Roger Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REv. 163, 241-42 (1976).
85 See id
86 See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 18, at 154 (finding that most survey respondents
would find entrapped individuals guilty but consider the facts of entrapment to mitigate the
offense and justify a lower punishment); Altman & Lee, supra note 76, at 58-59 (1982)
(noting that most individuals would blame public officials for accepting a bribe even if very
large and offered repeatedly).
87 Dillof, supra note 76, at 853-56, also considers and rejects a "limited resources"
rationale for excusing individuals for failing to develop the character necessary to resist
significant criminal temptations.
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Finally, consider a technical point by Carlson. He defends the
entrapment defense by contending that the acts committed in an undercover
operation may fail to be wrongful.88 On many retributivist accounts, we can
only blame an individual for wrongful conduct and conduct is wrongful
only when it harms or risks harming the socially recognized interests of
others. Yet, Carlson claims that, in many undercover operations, "the
actual crime that the government seeks to punish.., is so completely under
the control of the government that there is neither any actual invasion of a
protected legal interest, nor any genuine threat to the interests that the law
in question protects."
89
Even granting his premises, Carlson's contention is unpersuasive.
Note initially that Carlson selects the narrowest possible conceptual level at
which to judge whether the defendant's conduct poses a risk of harm: the
specific circumstances of the defendant's behavior. But one might adopt a
broader level of generality: that the defendant's conduct is wrongful if it
ordinarily risks harming the recognized interests of others (or, alternatively,
that the conduct would cause or risk harm given the defendant's subjective
perspective 9°). Under this view, government observation and control might
be seen as a mere fortuity, which does not affect the risk ordinarily posed
by the conduct. If so, then undercover conduct is wrongful if the same
conduct is wrongful outside undercover operations. Which level of
generality is appropriate? I only note that the implications of Carlson's
narrow view are inconsistent with existing practice. His argument entails
that there can be no wrongful conduct when the government, or some other
party intent on preventing crime, is in firm control of the behavioral
environment, thus eliminating the risk of harm. For example, government
agents sometimes "stake out" and entirely control an environment even
when there is no undercover operation. 9' The logic of Carlson's position is
88 Carlson, supra note 69, at 1059-67.
89 Id. at 1061.
90 Dillof, supra note 76, at 843-44, criticizes Carlson for ignoring this form of
"subjective retributivism."
91 Similarly, potential victims may be aware of a criminal attempt and take actions to
render its completion impossible. Thus, Carlson's claim that acts encouraged in undercover
operations are not "wrongful" undermines the basis for attempt liability whenever the effort
at crime is doomed to fail. In a later section, Carlson draws his own parallel between
undercover acts and attempt, claiming "punishing encouraged conduct should be treated as a
form of inchoate liability that the entrapment rule seeks to restrict within sensible
boundaries." Id. at 1075. Carlson's theory is that the entrapment defense tries to determine
whether the defendant is dangerous much like modem attempt doctrine. Id. at 1075-82.
That approach seems to concede the need for a utilitarian, not a retributive justification. In
any event, modem attempt law aims to base liability on acts that ordinarily demonstrate
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that the acts committed in these situations cannot be wrongful (or
blameworthy) because, narrowly viewed, the actors pose no real threat.
92
To the contrary, our normal practice is to ask about the ordinary dangers
posed by the type of conduct at issue, judged a higher level of generality
than the facts of the particular case. Judged accordingly, otherwise criminal
acts in undercover operations are wrongful, and therefore deserve blame.
93
In conclusion, let me repeat that it is possible that our current blaming
practices are, at some deep level, wrong. But if so, the problem requires
rethinking far more than the entrapment defense. 94 The question I address
is whether we can give a normative account of the defense that is mostly
consistent with existing commitments. Given our ordinary practices of
blame, those who commit otherwise criminal acts in undercover operations
are blameworthy for doing so.95
B. UTILITARIAN ANALYSIS: A NEED TO AVOID POINTLESS
PUNISHMENT
There are many costs and benefits to undercover operations, but it is
difficult to imagine any simple tabulation as justifying an entrapment
defense. The defense seems more useful as a means of encouraging police
to avoid particular tactics, so the justification needs to be tied to the
undesirability of certain tactics. There is such an approach, an economic
distinction between desirable and undesirable undercover tactics. To
describe it, I introduce some terminology. The external offense principle
asks would this defendant commit this sort of offense outside of undercover
dangerousness, not on proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the particular defendant is
dangerous.
92 More generally, there are many crimes that prohibit behavior that does not in every
case cause or risk harm even outside of a controlled environment. To the crimes of
operating a motor vehicle without a license, it is no defense to the safest driver on the road.
93 There is another problem. Police sometimes do not control the environment of an
operation sufficiently to prevent all risk. One example is a sting where a covert agent poses
as a "fence" who buys stolen goods. Because the operation lasts for months and some theft
victims are never identified, it may encourage thefts that cause real harm. See Kenneth
Weiner et al., Stinging the Detroit Criminal, IV POLICE & LAW ENFORCEMENT 283, 290
(1987). Carlson's argument implies that the acts in these undercover operations are
wrongful because they risk harming the interests of others. It seems odd (and to create odd
incentives) that an individual is blameworthy when caught in risky or disorganized
undercover operations but not in safe and well-managed ones.
94 See Seidman, supra note 15, at 132.
') Even though retributive theory does not require a defense, on some version it permits
one. Those retributivists who see blame only as necessary to justify punishment would
permit a defense. Those who see a moral obligation to punish the blameworthy would rule
out the defense.
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operations? If we answer this question affirmatively, then I call the
defendant a true offender. If she does not commit this sort of offense
except in undercover operations, I call her a false offender. If this
dichotomy seems suspect, let me say now that I eventually question it. But
the terminology merely tracks the frequently expressed idea that I labeled
the external offense principle. That idea claims that the state is justified in
punishing those who would otherwise offend-"true offenders"-but not
those who would not--"false offenders." The economic justification for the
defense is a claim that, though the punishment of true offenders produces
desirable consequences, the punishment of false offenders does not.
Richard Posner, Steve Shavell, and Bruce Hay have each made this
claim.96 They each begin with the utilitarian premise that, absent a social
benefit, punishment is a needless, indefensible act. If the offender would
not otherwise commit the crime, then there is no benefit to having the state
first induce that crime in an undercover operation and then punish her for it.
Posner makes the point by turning the question around and asking why it is
ever desirable for government to encourage a crime. Posner answers that
undercover operations are sometimes the cheapest means of detecting
ongoing criminal activity. 97 When police find it difficult to prove criminal
charges using conventional investigative tactics, they will often find it
cheaper to induce the individual to commit a crime in the presence of
police. The purpose of undercover operations, therefore, is to apprehend
existing offenders. That purpose is not served when the apprehended
individual is a non-offender, who, for some reason, commits the criminal
act only in an undercover operation. Thus, the entrapment defense ensures
that police use undercover operations in a way that is consistent with their
purpose, by ensuring that the individual otherwise offends. The defense
prevents the state from needlessly punishing (what I call) false offenders.
By contrast, some commentators claim that utilitarianism is not
consistent with the defense. Though the primary purpose of this Part is to
critique existing theory, I first extend economic theory to defend it against
extant criticisms. Because I eventually rely on an economic approach, it is
important to answer outstanding objections. Nonetheless, I follow by
offering my own critique.
96 See POSNER, supra note 74, at 255; Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the
Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1193, 1220 (1985); Shavell, supra note 75, at 1256-57;
Bruce Hay, Sting Operations, Undercover Agents, and Entrapment, 70 Mo. L. REv. 398-99
(2005); cf Brian L. Goff & Robert D. Tollison, Using (Im)perfect Markets to Catch
Criminals, 21 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 31, 40 (1993) (discussing how entrapment might "be
erected around an estimate of the elasticity of demand in the [criminal] market").
97 Posner, supra note 96, at 1220.
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1. Entrapment and Economics: A Reply to Existing Criticism
The objections to the economic theory are that there are crime
prevention benefits from punishing anyone who offends in an undercover
operation, even the "entrapped," and that there is no reason for courts,
rather than police, to decide how best to structure undercover operations. I
consider and reject each criticism in turn.
a. Crime Prevention Benefits
Punishing false offenders obviously does not produce individual crime
prevention. That is, if the individual will not offend when "left to [her] own
devices," 98 then there is no need to specifically deter, incapacitate, or
rehabilitate her. Creating and then punishing a false offender cannot
decrease the amount of the crime she will commit because, by definition,
she will commit none.
The less obvious argument concerns general deterrence. Some claim
that punishing the entrapped will increase the perceived probability of
detection. Seidman says, "[E]ven if the entrapped defendant is not
dangerous, his incarceration may nonetheless reduce crime by deterring
others." 99 Dillof agrees, "Any convictions, even those of the nondisposed,
advance the cause of general deterrence."' 00 If so, then it is not necessarily
wasteful to punish the entrapped.
I take this criticism to claim that there is a deterrence benefit to
punishing false offenders. 10 1  With one exception, the critics' view is
erroneous. 10 2  The exception is that, when law enforcement directs
undercover operations against a particular criminal population for the first
time (e.g., the first terrorist sting), convicting even a false offender could
98 United States v. Jacobsen, 503 U.S. 540, 553-54 (1992).
99 Seidman, supra note 15, at 141; see id. ("Potential criminals who know that police are
utilizing an entrapment policy will realize that there is a greater risk that they will be
apprehended and so will be less tempted to commit crime.").
1oo See Dillof, supra note 76, at 862 (emphasis added); see also id. at 858-59 ("[Ilt is
hard to doubt that punishing more will deter more"). Carlson, supra note 69, at 1069,
agrees: "The courts' blanket endorsement of encouragement [of crime] would enhance the
law's deterrent force ....-
101 In my own critique infra at Part II.B.2.b, where I reject the distinction between true
and false offenders, I introduce a middle category-probabilistic offenders-and claim that
their punishment does enhance deterrence. It is possible one could then partially reconcile
my view with that of Seidman, Dillof, and Carlson, if most "entrapped" offenders are
probabilistic rather than false. Nonetheless, it is important to see why punishing false
offenders is utterly wasteful.
102 It is similar to the erroneous idea that punishing the innocent will generally promote
deterrence. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L.
REv. 961, 1269 n.745 (2001).
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publicize the new tactic and enhance deterrence. Even if the convicted
offender is false, unapprehended true offenders will now realize the
government has shifted into such tactics, thus raising their perceived
probability of detection. But that advantage is small and fleeting.
Apprehending true offenders also publicizes a new operation and, in any
event, once the tactic is familiar, there is no publicity benefit from
apprehending false offenders. 0 3  In the long run, individuals care only
about the probability of their own detection, which they judge from the
probability of detecting the class of individuals like themselves.l0 4 Ongoing
true offenders care about the probability of detecting ongoing offenders.
That probability is not affected by the punishment of false offenders, which
therefore does not improve deterrence.
To illustrate, consider a stylized example. Assume an equilibrium,
created with conventional law enforcement and no undercover operations,
in which 100 individuals commit one particular crime per year, ten of
whom are apprehended and incarcerated, while an additional ten offenders
are added each year to replace them (coming from a new cohort of young
adults or prior offenders released from prison). The probability of detection
is 10%.105 Now suppose we introduce undercover operations that each year
catch an additional six individuals per year, three of whom are ongoing,
true offenders and three of whom are false offenders who do not commit the
offense outside an undercover operation. From the perspective of the
ongoing offenders, there is no difference in punishing all six individuals (as
would occur with no entrapment defense) and punishing only the three who
were previously committing the offense (as would occur with an ideal
entrapment defense). In either case, the actual probability that a true
offender will be apprehended is now 13%.106
103 Thus, the publicity advantage cannot apply to the vast run of undercover operations in
the world today-for drug crimes, money laundering, bribery, etc.-because it is already
well-known that federal and state governments use undercover tactics to detect these crimes.
104 More precisely, for a person contemplating a criminal act, the relevant probability of
detection is one informed by all variables that influence her detection. For example, if the
probability of detecting burglary consistently varies with whether it occurs in the day or
night, it would make sense for professional burglars to care only about the probability of
detection for the type of burglary they commit.
105 One need not suppose that criminals consciously calculate or precisely know the
probability in order to imagine that its magnitude influences their behavior, as considerable
evidence demonstrates. See, e.g., Steven D. Levitt & Thomas J. Miles, Empirical Study of
Criminal Punishment, in HANDBOOK OF LAW & ECONOMICS (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell eds., 2006) (forthcoming).
106 Punishing false offenders does affect the deterrence of those not currently offending.
But because these offenders already have a negative expected value for offending-they are
already deterred-this added deterrence is valueless.
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The key is that, as long as the undercover tactic consistently
apprehends some false offenders, the true offender discounts the future
threat of such tactics by the proportion of false offenders they apprehend. If
we alter the hypothetical so that all six individuals newly apprehended by
undercover tactics are false, then these tactics exert no influence on the true
offender's perceived probability. The detection rate remains at 10%.
Conversely, if all six are true offenders, then the probability of detecting
true offenders is now 16/100 or 16%. The probability is higher because the
results are now undiluted by the apprehension of false offenders. Punishing
false offenders-non-offenders outside of undercover operations-does not
aid deterrence.
The contrary idea-that society enhances deterrence by convicting
false offenders-arises only by assuming that true offenders will
continuously make a particular mistake: they will perceive false offenders
as true. In the original hypothetical (with three false offenders), true
offenders might now imagine that all sixteen apprehended offenders are
"true" and that the probability of detection is now 16/100 or 16%.'0'
Mistakes of this sort are possible, but so are other mistakes this analysis
ignores. For instance, true offenders might conversely perceive that true
offenders caught in undercover operations are false. In the original
hypothetical, the observers might believe all six apprehended individuals
are false offenders. If so, then true offenders continue to perceive a 10%
probability of detection even though the actual probability is 13%. Thus,
assuming one kind of mistake, we gain deterrence from punishing false
offenders, but assuming another kind of mistake we gain no deterrence
from punishing true offenders. Seidman and Dillof offer no evidence or
argument for their assumption that the former mistakes will occur instead of
the latter.
When one considers all possible mistakes, the conventional economic
assumption is that they will balance each other out. Some offenders
overestimate the percentage of apprehended individuals who are true
offenders, others underestimate the percentage, and the average offender's
estimate is correct. Alternatively, behavioral economists identify biases
that cause errors to be systematically skewed rather than evenly distributed
around the true value. In the behavioral literature, the relevant bias appears
to be optimism,'0 8 which would cause existing offenders to believe that
107 Or they might believe that the number of offenses has increased to 103 per year, and
that the detection rate is 16/103 or 15.5%.
108 See, e.g., Christine M. Jolls, On Law Enforcement with Boundedly Rational Agents, in
THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR (Francesco Parisi & Vernon Smith eds.,
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their ability to elude apprehension is greater than it really is. In the context
of sting operations, overconfidence means that the average offender
systematically underestimates the percentage of apprehended individuals
who are true offenders.'0 9 Equivalently, true offenders are likely to err by
believing some true offenders are false, while correctly identifying false
offenders as false. If so, punishing false offenders will, as before, generate
no deterrent benefits.
b. Institutional Competence
Another objection to the economic theory is that we should not trust
courts to make complex policy judgments concerning undercover
operations. Police have better information than courts about the effect of
various tactics. Seidman states, "The efficiency argument explains why a
sensible police department might want to forgo an entrapment strategy in
some cases, but not why we should have a formal, judicially enforced
doctrine incorporating that judgment." 10  Even if conviction of false
offenders is undesirable, perhaps judicial oversight of police is not worth
the costs. This is an important objection that has not previously been given
adequate attention.
Police are, of course, imperfectly motivated agents. The
principal/agent problem, much discussed in private law, is of even greater
importance in criminal law because the agents-such as police and
prosecutors-are public employees free from the discipline of market
pressure."' Though police are subject to some political pressure, these
place only minimal constraints on the actions of police detectives who run
undercover operations. 1 2
2004); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1051, 1091-95 (2000).
109 More concretely, undercover operations require that the police succeed in deceiving
the target. A professional/recidivist criminal might overestimate the ability of other such
true offenders to "sniff out" an undercover operation, thus overestimating the number of
false offenders.
110 Seidman, supra note 15, at 143; see also KATZ, supra note 77, at 158 ("It is unlikely
that the police would pursue entrapment activities beyond the point at which, on the margin,
the [costs and benefits] balance each other out."); Seidman, supra note 15, at 144 ("[O]ne
would expect the police themselves to be motivated to use scarce resources in a manner that
maximizes the number of criminals apprehended.").
111 See Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors,
103 COLUM. L. REv. 749 (2003); Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market
System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 300-01 (1983); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics
of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REv. 505, 549-50 (2001).
112 Of course, if legislatures or chief executives were themselves ideally motivated, they
would independently act to prevent police from apprehending false (or as I later term them
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Of course, despite agency problems, we defer many policy issues to
the police (e.g., how to deploy patrol officers) because judicial oversight is
thought to be worse. The agency cost point, however, is not merely that the
public fails to motivate police to allocate crime-fighting resources in an
optimal way. Instead, the problem is that the public has motivated police to
go too far in using undercover operations, absent an entrapment defense or
other regulation. Police bureaucracies respond generally to intense political
pressure for crime control by trying to create incentives for individual
officers to control crime. An incentive requires some measure of job
performance and, for the detective, a common criterion is her "clearance
rate," the rate at which she solves a case by making an arrest of the
suspected perpetrator. 113 The value placed on clearance rates carries over to
motivate officers to value arrests even when-as in most proactive
"low value") offenders. The need for judicial regulation arises from the failure of these other
governmental branches. Explaining this failure is complex, requiring a general theory of the
principal/agent problems involved in criminal justice. For now, I note only that the public is,
like other principals, inattentive and uninformed. As a result, public pressure for crime
control generates stronger incentives for politicians to appear "tough on crime" than to
ensure the most effective use of crime-fighting resources. For purposes of re-election,
politicians usually create the right appearance by leaving the police unregulated. See Donald
A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; Or, Why
Don't Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYR. L. REv. 1079
(1993); Stuntz, supra note I11.
Consider two possible exceptions. First, about half the states codify the entrapment
defense. See MARCUS, supra note 13, at 705-43. But rather than providing regulation that
obviates the need for judicial regulation, these state legislatures embrace open-ended
statutory language that does little more than to authorize judicial regulation. Second, the
U.S. Attorney General has established guidelines for F.B.I. undercover operations. See AG
Guidelines, supra note 39. Some of these provisions plausibly address the concerns raised
by the economic rationale, especially Section V.B(4), which requires either (i) that there is a
"reasonable indication" that the targeted individual has engaged, is engaging, or will engage
in the illegal activity proposed or (ii) that the opportunity created is "structured" so that any
individuals "drawn" or "brought" to the opportunity are "predisposed" to commit that crime.
Id. at 16. 1 use a similar two-tiered approach in proposing my own formulation of
entrapment in Part IV.B infra. For present purposes, however, there is little reason to
believe these guidelines reflect the absence of an agency problem. The guidelines first arose
in 1976, well after the Supreme Court created the entrapment defense and seem responsive
to that judicial innovation. See OIG's REPORT, supra note 37, at 36. Moreover, the recent
audit by the DOJ's Office of Inspector General, while examining the F.B.I.'s compliance
with other regulations, provides no analysis of compliance with the particular regulations
aimed at avoiding entrapment. Id. at 137-68.
113 To sharpen the point, contrast it with two alternatives. First, society might ideally
motivate police to maximize the public interest in crime control. That is the point I have just
argued against in the text. Second, pessimistically, society might fail to motivate them at all,
so that they fail to put forth any effort whatsoever. This is obviously false. The truth
certainly lies between these extreme possibilities.
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undercover operations-there is no previously reported crime to "clear." In
short, bureaucratic incentives motivate arrests.
A pessimist might claim that the police bureaucracies motivate officers
to maximize arrests without regard to the evidence of guilt. But it is
implausible to think that the typical detective acts this way. Clearance rates
are sometimes defined by whether a prosecutor charges the person
arrested.11 4 Even where police "clear" a case merely by arrest, detectives
must care whether the person arrested was the perpetrator, or they would
just arrest anyone, and all "clearance rates" would be 100%. Surely, most
detectives maximize some conception of a good arrest. The police
conception undoubtedly differs from the technical requirements of law, but
it is hard to believe that the police understanding of a valid arrest is entirely
immune to legal requirements. If prosecutors always refuse to bring certain
kinds of cases, it is unlikely that the police would forever ignore this reality
and continue to believe this type of arrest was a "good" one.' 1
5
Here, then, is the problem. Without an entrapment defense, the arrest
of a false offender is a "good" arrest; it will even produce a conviction.'
6
Absent the defense, police seeking to maximize "good" arrests will
structure undercover operations so as to maximize the number of
individuals who accept the created opportunity, even if that includes many
false offenders. In deciding how tempting to make the criminal
opportunity, police will almost always favor "more" to "less." The only
reasons not to offer the maximal temptation are the possibility of costs
borne by police (e.g., the time to create a romantic relationship with the
target) and the chance that the target will recognize an excessively tempting
offer as a sting operation. Frequently, however, it is no more costly to
114 This is how federal statistics define clearance of a case. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS: SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS tbl.4.19 n.
(2003), available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t419.pdf.
115 This point does not contradict the claim that the suppression of evidence obtained in
violation of Fourth Amendment rights may not deter such violations. See, e.g., Christopher
Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 368-
71. First, violating the Fourth Amendment frequently does not prevent a conviction.
Evidence obtained by a violation is often admitted because of standing requirements and
good faith and inevitable discovery exceptions. Even with suppression, other evidence may
secure a conviction. Second, police have many motives for searches and seizures other than
conviction (e.g., disrupting attempts, destroying contraband, harassment), but the primary
motive for undercover operations is to produce an arrest.
116 Of course, if prosecutors were optimally motivated, they would on their own decide
never to prosecute individuals apprehended in undercover operations that would tempt false
offenders, even in the absence of an entrapment defense. Prosecutors might thereby redefine
"good" arrests and control police. But prosecutors are not so ideally motivated. They seem
instead to maximize convictions and/or their trial win rate. If so, then absent an entrapment
defense or other regulation, prosecutors will seek to convict false offenders.
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make a criminal opportunity more attractive, as by naming a better
exchange price or inventing a reason to believe the risks of detection are
unusually low. Though the risk that a savvy criminal will recognize an
offer is "too good to be true" may exert some discipline on police, it may
also lead to a worst case scenario, where police make unrealistically
attractive offers because many naive false offenders-but only false
offenders-will accept them. One wonders, for example, if Lively would
have been more wary of Desai had she actually been in the business of
selling cocaine. 117
There are two more specific problems. First, in complex stings, where
the police must invest time to cultivate the target's trust, they will have an
incentive to keep increasing the temptation if the target initially resists.
Even if the police start by offering a modest temptation to crime, if it takes
a month to set up the sting and propose the transaction, they will often
expect greater returns from quickly increasing the temptation to the same
target than from starting over with a new target. Second, police often
supervise confidential informants in stings, thus creating a second level of
agency costs. Especially when those informants earn cash or leniency for
the arrests they produce (as Desai in Lively), they have no incentive to care
whether the target is a true or false offender. 118
An entrapment defense or other regulation may improve matters.
First, because the defense will probably influence what the police count as a
"good" arrest, they will respond by structuring operations to defeat the
defense. This is especially true in the jurisdictions where prosecutors are
involved in setting up undercover operations. Second, even if the defense
has no effect on the undercover operation, it prevents the conviction of false
offenders whose punishment serves no utilitarian ends. In sum, the case for
strong deference to police is weak. Courts may serve a useful monitoring
function in this context, just as they do in other police contexts (e.g., search
and seizure) and for other bureaucracies (e.g., administrative agencies).
2. A New Critique of the Economic Rationale
The economic rationale seems to allow one to view entrapment,
especially the subjective test, as structurally similar to other defenses,
117 See State v. Lively, 921 P.2d 1035 (Wash. 1996), discussed in the introduction.
I8 See, e.g., Susan S. Kuo, Official Indiscretions: Considering Sex Bargains with
Government Informants, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1643 (2005). After 1990s scandals
involving F.B.I. informants, see supra note 27, the Justice Department sought to tighten
regulatory control. Yet a 2005 audit found "significant problems" in the F.B.I.'s compliance
with DOJ guidelines, including compliance errors in 87% of the reviewed informant files.
See OIG's REPORT, supra note 37, at 7-8.
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despite the absence of a retributive rationale. If punishing false offenders
does not generate utilitarian benefits while punishing true offenders does,
and if the entrapment defense focuses on facts that distinguish true from
false offenders, then entrapment doctrine determines whether there is a
utilitarian justification for punishing the defendant. If so, then we can
understand why, despite the defendant's apparent blameworthiness, the
false offender who will not otherwise offend is, in a sense, "innocent."
As natural or attractive as this view may be, I believe it is wrong. The
entrapment defense is not coherent when viewed as an effort to determine
whether particular defendants are, in any sense, "innocent," nor even to
determine whether a particular defendant's punishment will generate
utilitarian benefits. Here, I critique the standard economic rationale with
alternative arguments: there is a severe difficulty in distinguishing true from
false offenders in a particular case without incurring the costs undercover
operations are supposed to avoid; and the dichotomy between true and false
offenders is illusory.
a. The Challenge of Proving the External Offense
The standard economic rationale-there is no benefit from punishing
someone who would not offend outside an undercover operation-has an
odd evidentiary implication. To view entrapment doctrine as a means of
separating true from false offenders implies that we are actually punishing
the defendant for an act that she does outside the undercover operation and
using the undercover act merely as evidence of that offense. To make this
point clear, call the individual's criminal conduct in an undercover
operation the "internal act" and the individual's criminal conduct outside of
undercover operations the "external act." 119  Assume that the culpable
mental state exists in either case. On the one hand, proving the external act
by itself justifies punishment. On the other hand, the economic rationale
says that the internal act justifies punishment only if we also believe the
defendant otherwise commits the external act, not if the defendant is
externally law-abiding. Thus, the external act is necessary and sufficient to
justify punishment, but the internal act is neither necessary nor sufficient.
119 For ease of exposition, I assume here that an external offense is one a true offender
has committed outside the undercover operation, though in the next section I consider how
the analysis applies to those who have not but will commit the offense outside the
undercover operation. The argument in this section-the difficulty of proving an external




The relevance of the internal act is only that it provides evidence of the
external act,120 which is always the basis for criminal punishment.
This implication requires defending. In most jurisdictions, the
government bears the ultimate burden of disproving entrapment beyond a
reasonable doubt.121 Yet the jury is never told that the government must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed an external
criminal act. Even in jurisdictions that place the burden of proof on the
defendant, it is odd that the prosecution is relieved of proving the external
act beyond a reasonable doubt, when she would have that burden in any
case not involving an undercover operation. In any event, the point is not
merely about the burden of proof. In undercover cases, we never frame the
ultimate issue for the fact-finder as whether the defendant has committed
the crime outside the undercover operation. And if we did, we would have
severe difficulty in most cases allowing the jury to reach this conclusion
because the matter would remain so speculative (just when and where did
the external act occur?).
One might respond that government can always introduce additional
evidence, along with the defendant's undercover acts, to demonstrate that
the defendant has committed an external offense at a particular time and
place. Yet here we also meet serious objection. The need for additional
evidence to prove the external offense may easily defeat the entire purpose
of the undercover operation. Undercover operations are initially justified
by a lack of information about whether the defendant is currently offending.
If we could already prove which individuals were current offenders, we
would not need the undercover operation. Yet this fact is apparently the
very thing we need to know to avoid convicting false offenders. We need
additional information to distinguish true from false offenders, but requiring
too much information defeats the purpose of undercover operations, which
is to detect criminality more cheaply than conventional methods.
Perhaps there is a way to thread this needle. The prosecutor might
combine the evidence of the defendant's internal offense with relatively
cheap additional evidence of the defendant's external offense. One might
view the predisposition inquiry as requiring that the jury receive additional
evidence of the defendant's external offending beyond the mere fact of an
internal offense. Together, the evidence might prove an external offense
120 As a concrete example, if we convict a person of felony "distribution of narcotics"
based on her act of selling cocaine to an undercover police agent at 5:12 p.m. on June 1, this
evidentiary view says that we can justify punishing this individual only if we therefore
believe that she sold narcotics at some point other than at 5:12 p.m. on June 1, to someone
not an undercover agent (for which she has not already been convicted).
12 1 LAFAVE, supra note 60, at 517.
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beyond a reasonable doubt more cheaply than would conventional
investigative techniques.
I remain skeptical. I offer a numerical example to justify my
skepticism. The appropriate statistical construct for this analysis is
Bayesian probability. 122 Bayesian analysis contrasts one's prior subjective
beliefs about the probability of an event with an updated belief that
incorporates new information. In this context, one begins with a prior
estimate of the probability that the targeted individual has committed an
external offense. If there is no reason to suspect a given individual at the
outset-the police selected her by chance-then one's prior is equal to the
proportion of the general population (from which the police selected the
defendant) that commits the offense, the base rate of crime in this
population. The undercover operation is then an experiment that provides
new information: that the targeted individual accepts the undercover
inducement makes it more likely that she is a true offender. The strength of
belief-updating will depend on the false positive rate-the conditional
probability that one will accept the undercover inducement, given that one
does not otherwise commit the offense-and the false negative rate-the
conditional probability that one will reject the undercover inducement,
given that one does otherwise commit the offense.123 The fact finder thus
decides the probability that the individual offends externally, given that she
offended internally. At this point, if we are not convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt, we can seek additional evidence of external guilt. The
strength of the inference from the undercover offense tells us just how
much more evidence we need to convict. In subjective test terms, it tells us
how high a bar to set for deciding someone is predisposed.
Now for the example. If police select the target by chance (as both
entrapment tests and the economic theory permit), then our prior estimate is
the base rate-the percentage of the population who commit the crime in
question. The problem-sometimes termed the "false positive
paradox"124-arises when the "base rate" is low, which will normally be the
122 1 thank Andrew Bloch for first drawing my attention to the relevance of Bayesian
updating to undercover operations at a 1998 Harvard Law and Economics workshop. Bruce
Hay, supra note 96, also uses a Bayesian framework, though his analysis differs
considerably.
123 Obviously, I borrowed from this terminology when I introduced the terms "false
offender" and "true offender," which correspond, respectively, to false positive and true
positive. The other two possible outcomes are a "false non-offender"--one who fails to
commit a criminal act in the undercover operation but otherwise does offend and a "true
non-offender"--one who fails to commit a criminal act in the undercover operation and
otherwise does not offend.
124 LARRY GONICK & WOOLLcoTr SMITH, THE CARTOON GUIDE TO STATISTICS 49 (1993).
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case for serious crimes. Suppose the base rate for the crime is one in 1000.
Suppose that the false positive rate is 5%, which seems acceptably low. For
simplicity, suppose that the false negative rate (the probability of an
ongoing offender not accepting the undercover offer) is zero. The expected
result of 1000 operations is as follows: the one true offender in the group
accepts the police inducement; the police also offer the inducement to 999
non-offenders, 5% of whom-or fifty-accept. Thus, of those accepting
the undercover inducement, only one of fifty-one-less than 2%-are true
positives; 98% of the positives are false positives. One might think the
police are using a successful undercover tactic if there is only a 5% chance
that an otherwise law-abiding citizen will accept the government's
inducement. But if the base rate of criminality is low, as will be true if
police select targets randomly, then most of the targets in the undercover
operations are otherwise law-abiding. As a result, almost everyone who
does accept the inducement is a false offender. 125
Given this outcome, one needs very substantial additional evidence of
external offending in order to conclude by conventional levels of certainty
that the person has offended externally. 12 6 By contrast, the objective test for
entrapment would allow conviction without any additional evidence. Given
how low the false positive rate is in the example, the inducement obviously
does not tempt the average citizen. So the undercover offenders will lose
125 The problem is severe as long as the prior probability is low. Suppose the false
positive rate isfifty times lower than the previous example-1 in 1000 or 0.1%-and all else
is the same. The results of 1000 undercover operations are still bleak: on average, for every
true positive that accepts the inducement one false positive will also accept. Thus, with an
extremely low false positive rate, 50% of those accepting the undercover inducement are
false positives. Unless the false positive rate is zero or perhaps trivially above zero, a low
base rate means that the acceptance of the undercover inducement is not, by itself, sufficient
evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual is a true offender.
This "false positive paradox" is not actually paradoxical. When the base rate is low, it
means that most of the population consists of negatives. As a result, the number of positives
who can test positive is necessarily low, but the false positive rate is multiplied by a large
number of negatives.
126 1 made the point assuming random targeting, but the result would occur if we assume
the police begin with evidence of suspicion: given a false positive rate of 5%, one must raise
the prior estimate of offending (from the base rate) very significantly to ensure that the
undercover offense is sufficient to prove external offending beyond a reasonable doubt. One
needs very substantial evidence to lower the base rate significantly. For example, suppose
additional evidence raises the prior estimate of offending fifty-fold from the base rate of
0.001 to 0.05. Running 1000 operations now yields 50 true offenders and 47.5 false
offenders, so that the probability that an undercover offender is true is only slightly better
than chance. Raising the prior estimate further to 0.5 will probably suffice because 1000
undercover operations yield 500 true offenders and only 25 false offenders; over 95% of
offenders are true. But one might guess that the evidence required to raise the prior from
0.001 to 0.5 is substantial and costly.
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the objective entrapment defense in some jurisdictions even though most
are false. One can then see the subjective test's predisposition element as
coming to the rescue by requiring additional evidence. The good news is
that it is cheap to prove predisposition-one need only point to the
defendant's absence of reluctance or prior conviction for the same offense.
Because it is cheap, undercover operations may remain cheaper than
alternative investigative tactics. The bad news is predisposition is very
weak evidence of external offending. No one really thinks that the absence
of reluctance, for example, does much to prove an actual external offense.
Indeed, the U.S. Attorney who convicted Lakhani for selling missiles to
F.B.I. undercover agents posing as terrorists conceded that he did not know
whether Lakhani could have ever acquired missiles to sell on his own
(without the help of other undercover agents from Russian intelligence).1 27
If the prosecutor cannot even say it is probable that the defendant would
have ever committed a similar offense, then obviously he would not claim
to have proved an external offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
To return to the main point: though we never really know the false
positive rate, the entrapment defense seems necessary to many people
because they think it is more than utterly trivial. If so, then we probably
cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is a true
offender unless the government had substantial additional evidence of her
guilt, much more than predisposition requires. We could still interpret the
economic theory as justifying an entrapment defense, but one that requires
far more evidence of external offending. Yet the more the additional
evidence we require, the less likely it is that an undercover operation will
prove a cheaper means of apprehending offenders. I do not claim to have
proved, in a deductive sense, that the problem is insolvable, but there is
reason to be pessimistic. In sum, the evidentiary oddity of the economic
view-that we are actually prosecuting the defendant for crimes committed
outside the undercover operation-is matched by the likelihood that it
renders undercover operations impractical.
b. The Problem of Scarce Opportunities and "Probabilistic" Offenders
There is a second problem. The Posner/Shavell/Hay rationale
distinguishes between true and false offenders-my terms for their
conceptual categories of those who do and do not commit offenses outside
undercover operations. On closer inspection, this dichotomy is illusory.'28
127 See This American Life: The Arms Trader, supra note 26.
128 It is possible that these authors did not intend a simple dichotomy, though their
analysis implies one. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 96, at 1220 (undercover operations make
economic sense if "the defendant would have committed the same crime ... if he had not
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There is a middle category of "probabilistic offenders" who will in the
future commit the offense outside an undercover operation with a
probability less than one. We gain individual prevention and general
deterrence from punishing probabilistic offenders. Not only must the
theory account for this more realistic view of offenders, it is possible that,
for some crimes, there are no false offenders-because everyone who
offends in the undercover operation will offend externally with some
positive probability.
The dichotomy between true and false offenders begins to dissolve
when we ask precisely when a true offender would otherwise offend. One
possibility is that the true offender is someone who has already committed
the same kind of offense (but not been apprehended and punished for it) at
the time of the undercover operation. A second possibility is that a true
offender is someone who either has already committed the same kind of
offense or will do so in the future. I believe it is clear that the economic
rationale implicitly assumes the broader understanding of the true offender,
one that includes the individual who merely might offend in the future.
Where there is zero benefit from punishing a false offender, there is
some benefit from punishing a probabilistic offender who may commit an
offense in the future. Most obviously, there may be incapacitation benefits.
For example, preventing ten individuals from committing a crime when
each was only 50% likely to commit it will prevent an expected five
crimes. 129  Moreover, we enhance deterrence. The main reason that
individuals are probabilistic offenders 130 is that they will commit an offense
only if they encounter an unusually attractive opportunity. Some people
might never launder or counterfeit money, for example, unless they
encounter a scarce "golden opportunity" to make a quick fortune from the
crime.131 In these settings, the probability of one's offending depends on
the probability of encountering the scarce opportunity. If an undercover
fallen into the police trap" but not if "the police go further and induce him to commit crimes
that he would never commit in his ordinary environment.") (emphasis added). Perhaps the
reference to "ordinary environment" encompasses the probabilistic analysis that follows. If
so, then what follows is merely a more careful elaboration of the existing analysis.
129 Some will be understandably troubled by the utility of punishing people for what they
will do, rather than what they have done. But with undercover operations, the formal act
requirement is satisfied: we punish only those who voluntarily commit criminal acts in
undercover operations. We rule out punishment when those acts fail to provide a sufficient
basis for believing either that the individual has already committed an external offense or
will in the future. See infra, Part II.C.2 where I critique an institutional rationale for the
defense based on the act requirement.
130 Below, at Part III.A.1, I offer a more detailed and formal discussion of this point.
131 See, e.g., United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1199 (7th Cir. 1994) (en
banc) (regarding money-laundering and the hypothetical it posed regarding counterfeiting).
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operation causes an individual to offend by supplying her such a scarce
opportunity, punishing her will aid deterrence of such opportunistic crimes.
By contrast, if we grant a defense whenever the police offer such a golden
opportunity, then anyone who receives one will know that she could not be
punished if the offer came from an undercover agent. Knowing this, she
can safely treat any such offer as genuine. Thus, punishing the individual in
these operations contributes to deterrence in those cases where individuals
actually encounter such special criminal opportunities.
Thus, punishment is entirely pointless only if directed to individuals
who have not and will not, with any probability, commit the offense. The
point is damaging to the economic rationale because it is possible that
everyone who offends in an undercover operation is either a true or a
probabilistic offender. At least for some crimes (e.g., employee pilfering,
insurance fraud, 132 medicinal marijuana sales), it is possible that almost
anyone would commit the crime under scarce but possible conditions, so
there are no false offenders to protect. Put differently, think now of what it
means to be a false offender. Across all possible contingencies that can
arise for this individual other than undercover operations, even
contingencies that radically curtail her non-criminal opportunities and
radically expand her criminal opportunities, this person will not commit this
offense. If so, we may now wonder if an entrapment defense is actually
necessary to protect false offenders.
Nonetheless, if we want to ensure that government cannot convict even
a single false offender, then we would still need an entrapment defense.
But the economic rationale now justifies only the narrowest defense. If the
only economic objection is to the punishment of people who do not and will
not ever otherwise offend-that is, if it makes sense to permit the
punishment of probabilistic (as well as true) offenders-then it should be
sufficient merely to forbid the police from manipulating opportunities in
ways that cannot occur in the "real" world. Thus, economic theory may
justify what I will term the minimalist entrapment defense, one that limits
the government to offering temptations that occur outside undercover
operations, forbidding the creation of opportunities that have zero
probability of occurring externally. That is virtually no entrapment defense
at all; it is far narrower than the ones in existence in American
jurisdictions. 133
132 See THOMAS GABOR, EVERYBODY DOES IT! 73-97 (1994).
133 For example, the criminal offers in each of the Supreme Court cases on entrapment,
including the ones where the Court found entrapment as a matter of law, all surely exist
outside of undercover operations.
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In sum, the economic rationale faces alternative objections. First, if
there is a real danger of apprehending false offenders in undercover
operations, it is not clear how one can distinguish true from false offenders
without incurring costs that render the undercover operation impractical.
Second, because there are benefits to punishing probabilistic offenders,
there may be almost no risk of apprehending in undercover operations those
whose punishment would generate no benefit.
C. INSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS: A POLITICAL NEED FOR SIDE
CONSTRAINTS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
In criminal law scholarship, the conflict between retributive and
utilitarian theory sometimes obscures the importance of a different set of
concerns: how to design institutions that will best accomplish whatever
ends punishment appropriately serves. 3 4  The institutional concern
potentially includes both a concern for procedural fairness and a need to
design institutions with checks and balances that prevent private
misappropriation of government power. For both concerns, the familiar
starting point is to recognize that the strongest power the government
wields against its citizens is the power to arrest, take property without
compensation, incarcerate, and execute, that is, the power of criminal law
enforcement. Many constitutional rights and common law doctrines aim to
cabin this power135; a standard concern in liberal theory is how to prevent
government officials from abusing discretionary power to enforce criminal
law.
Institutional interests therefore offer a third possible means of
justifying the entrapment defense, by focusing on the propriety of
governmental action rather than the purposes of punishment,
Unfortunately, there is often an unilluminating circularity in the
134 Although utilitarians believe that one should consider all consequences of
punishment, modem economic utilitarians focus their criminal law analysis almost
exclusively on the purposes of punishment, that is, on evaluating rules by whether they
enhance or degrade criminal deterrence and incapacitation. Similarly, though many
retributivists agree that society can legitimately consider other factors in deciding whether to
punish the blameworthy (blame being necessary but not sufficient), most retributivists
nonetheless seek to tie criminal law doctrine tightly to a theory of blame, with only
occasional thought to the other factors that legitimately matter.
135 Examples include the clauses prohibiting Bills of Attainder and Ex Post Facto laws;
the interpretation of the due process clause proscribing excessively vague criminal statutes,
judicial interpretations that unforeseeably enlarge their scope, and vindictive prosecution; the
principal of legality (requiring legislative definition of crime) and the act requirement. All
plausibly serve to confine official discretion to tolerable levels, even though they sometimes
forbid punishment of the blameworthy or dangerous. See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality,
Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189 (1985).
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condemnation of "improper" tactics, a tendency to say that the entrapment
defense exists to prevent misconduct and then to declare that the undercover
operation in a particular case was misconduct for the reason that it
"entrapped" the defendant. 136  To understand the difficulty, we should
return to a point made about the retributive theory. In the case of private
encouragement of crime, not only do we blame the individual who
succumbs to the encouragements, we also treat as legitimate the use of
government power to punish the individual who succumbs. We are willing
to give government the power to punish individuals who give in to
temptation, even great temptation, as long as the temptation is not offered
by government.
The question is whether it matters that government itself is the source
of the temptation. The difference might matter for at least two reasons.
First, one might say that the individuals who the government persuades to
commit crime are being treated unfairly. Second, one might say that
society should not entrust officials with the unregulated power to encourage
and then punish crime, given the risk that officials will target political
enemies or unpopular scapegoats. The first institutional concern is
deontological; the latter is utilitarian. Each claim, however, faces serious
obstacles. As with a retributive theory, I do not claim that it would be
impossible to construct an institutional justification for the entrapment
defense (as, indeed, I attempt to do in Part III), but only that existing
analyses fail.
1. A Critique of the Fairness Theory
One means of grounding the entrapment defense in fairness is to say,
as some cases do, that the government "overbears the will" of the
defendant. 37 If the defendant's will is "overborne" by the government,
then punishment for the resulting act is arguably unfair. The problem with
this argument is obvious. We would punish the individual for giving in to
the exact same criminal temptation were it offered by a genuinely private
individual. If an individual retains free will in the latter case, there is no
reason to think otherwise when government offers the temptation.
Alternatively, some claim that it is unfair for government to provide a
criminal temptation to an individual who would never otherwise encounter
136 See Carlson, supra note 69, at 1019. "The argument that the defense is necessary to
deter police misconduct ... seems to be based upon little more than a tautological claim that
encouragement is bad because it 'falls below standards, to which common feelings respond,
for the proper use of governmental power."' Id. (quoting Sherman v. United States, 356
U.S. 369, 382 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
137 See, e.g., United States v. Ambrose, 483 F.2d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 1973).
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one. As Leo Katz puts it, everyone "is entitled to his turn at the wheel of
fortune. If he is lucky, he will never be faced with a situation in which his
criminal disposition surfaces. Entrapment is a way of rigging the wheel."''
38
This point is rhetorically appealing, but merely reformulates the external
offense principle. Just as that principle is not self-justifying, it is not
transparent why it is unfair for government to intentionally change the
criminal temptations one faces. To the contrary, the claim that government
manipulation of temptation is unfair seems to imply that the status quo
distribution of temptation is fair. Yet exposure to criminal temptations is
frequently arbitrary, a matter of luck. Many people avoid committing crime
only because they fortuitously never face the temptation to do so, without
any exercise of virtue or intent. Children of the affluent may never be
asked to join a criminal organization that steals cars or sells cocaine, while
those born into poverty face constant encouragement in those directions.
Some individuals never encounter a "golden" opportunity to become rich
stealing from their employer, insurance company, or bank, while others do.
If the current distribution of criminal temptation is arbitrary, why should we
recognize any right to complain about government changing it?
Some defendants might argue on behalf of the current distribution by
saying they intentionally distanced themselves from criminal temptation, as
by the careful selection of a neighborhood, job, or recreational venue. This
is the best case I can imagine for giving weight to the status quo
distribution. But, even here, the claim fails. Criminal law stills punishes an
individual who, by bad luck, is exposed to temptation despite her efforts to
avoid it. If a drug addict enters a drug rehabilitation program and cuts her
ties to friends who still use drugs, she has no defense if another "rehab"
patient (not an undercover agent) proposes a drug venture and she
succumbs. 3 9
138 KATZ, supra note 77, at 160-61. I consider Katz's main argument-conceming the
act requirement-infra, Part II.C.2; see also Dworkin, supra note 72. Dworkin says that our
scheme of punishment is a "choosing system" in which we allow individuals to "self-select[]
themselves" for punishment by choosing not to comply with the law. Id. at 30-31. He
contends that it is not only "unfair to the citizen to be invited to do that which the law forbids
him to do," but that "it is conceptually incoherent." Id. at 32. As to fairness, he neglects to
consider that even when government encourages crime, just as when genuinely private
citizens encourage crime short of duress, we can still consider the person so encouraged to
"self-select" for punishment by choosing to commit the encouraged act. As for coherence,
because government may legitimately seek the end of decreasing criminal acts, and if-as
Dworkin concedes-undercover operations are a means toward that end, then they are surely
coherent in any important sense.
139 One might try to distinguish the above analysis on the grounds that the government
manipulation of criminal opportunities is intentional. Yet there is no "private" entrapment
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Moreover, if we did care about achieving a fair distribution of criminal
temptations, the commitment would not produce anything like the current
entrapment defense. Fairness would plausibly require that government
ameliorate the arbitrariness of criminal temptations by equalizing them. If
some teenagers avoid temptation only because they were born into
affluence, perhaps fairness obligates the government either to remove the
temptation from the poor or to create it for the affluent. The only defense
this theory permits is one that prevents government from distributing
temptation in the wrong direction, further away from the equality ideal.
That the defendant would not otherwise offend would be irrelevant if the
only reason is that the defendant would fortuitously avoid a temptation
others encounter. I doubt this fairness argument as well, but it shows the
difficulty of justifying the defense.
Anthony Dillof, however, proposes a different theory, based on the
distributive justice norm that "to the extent possible, the cost of an activity
should be shared among all its beneficiaries."'140  The problem is that
entrapment places on an individual "a disproportionate share of the cost of
general crime prevention," much as if the government paid for police
activities by taxing only a handful of citizens.' 41 The state should instead
choose either to target everyone in undercover operations or to target only
some fair subset, such as ongoing offenders or the predisposed. Having
forgone the former strategy, fairness requires the latter.
1 42
Regrettably, I view criminal law as being almost entirely indifferent to
this fairness concern. A fundamental element of our existing commitments
is the unfettered discretion that police and prosecutors have to decline
enforcement and the parallel refusal to recognize a defense of failing to
prosecute other offenders. 43 Dillof concedes that police and prosecutors
routinely enforce criminal statutes by selecting from a pool of violators
(e.g., speeders and those caught in tax audits) and by targeting high profile
offenders. I would add that unequal burdening infects even the way
legislatures define crimes. For example, the ban on marijuana, as applied to
its medical uses, burdens some grievously and others not at all. Military
desertion is a crime that burdens the few to benefit the many. The rich and
the poor are equally prohibited from trespassing under bridges, but only the
defense when private individuals intentionally lure another individual into crime in order to
expose her to prosecution. See sources cited supra note 77.
140 Dillof, supra note 76, at 831.
141 Id. at 831, 876.
142 Id. at 878.
143 See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) ("[T]he conscious exercise of some
selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation.").
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poor suffer the burden. Perhaps it is normatively desirable, but embracing
Dillof's theory would seem to demand a radical transformation of criminal
justice.
Dillof's responses are, in my view, unpersuasive. First, he says that
conventional police tactics involve less selectivity than undercover
operations. He notes that police apprehend about twenty percent of external
offenders, but only a tiny percent of the nondisposed are entrapped.1 44 Note
that the twenty percent rate is the average for eight index crimes.
141
Clearance rates vary by crime and can be particularly low for non-index
crimes, like drug offenses, that go mostly unreported (precisely when
undercover operations are most useful). However low the rate, the key is
that criminal law gives the offender no defense. Indeed, the Supreme Court
once upheld the validity of prosecuting seventeen of an estimated 674,000
criminal non-registrants for the draft, 146 a prosecution rate of .003%.
Dillof also claims that undercover operations that entrap the
nondisposed are "unfair by design" whereas conventional police techniques
under-enforce the law as an "unavoidable side effect" of resource
constraints. 147 His argument is that police would apprehend all external
offenders "if they could" but, even without resource constraints, would
have no interest in entrapping all nondisposed offenders. 148  However,
police do not necessarily intend to apprehend any nondisposed individuals
in undercover operations; it may be only an unavoidable side effect of the
tactic. Moreover, William Stuntz argues persuasively that "the pathological
politics of criminal law" drive legislatures to enact over-broad and
overlapping criminal statutes with the intent that police and prosecutors will
drastically under-enforce them. 149  For such offenses, the fact that we
burden only the few is also "by design."'"5
144 Dillof, supra note 76, at 884.
145 See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED
STATES 2001, at 220 (2002).
146 Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 604 & nn.3-4 (1985).
147 Dillof, supra note 76, at 885-86.
14s Id. at 886 & n.201.
149 See Stuntz, supra note 111. Examples include the crimes of negligent assault,
negligent endangerment, and the "intangible rights" theory of fraud. Id. at 516-19. Dillof,
supra note 76, at 878, says that if the government ever chose to entrap all nondisposed
offenders, it would be forced to lower the penalties for the offense. Similarly, if the police
ever literally enforced the broad crimes Stuntz discusses, the legislatures would be forced to
narrow them.
150 Finally, Dillof contends that conventional law enforcement is necessary to prevent
crime, whereas undercover operations, though "cost-effective," are not. Dillof, supra note
76, at 884-85. But for most crimes, no single tactic, in isolation, is strictly "necessary." For
drug enforcement or bribery, it would be hard to say, for example, that police patrols,
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In the end, criminal doctrine fails to reflect the fairness concerns Dillof
advocates. Existing commitments seem to exclude fairness as a rationale
for regulating undercover operations.
2. A Critique of the Power Allocation Objection
Now turn to the power allocation argument. As with the economic
theory, this source of the problem here is the principal/agent problem, but
the risk is not just wasted resources, but the loss of liberty that results when
government officials wield the power to punish political enemies and
unpopular minorities. We need to know, however, why the manipulation of
criminal opportunities represents a uniquely dangerous power. Carlson
offers perhaps the best account, though I contend that he still falls short of
the mark.
Carlson begins with the criminal law "act requirement."' 51 We require
a voluntary act as a predicate for criminal liability, barring punishment for
mere thoughts and propensities, and for involuntary acts, though that is
defined quite narrowly to mean mostly bodily movements not produced by
mental effort. 52 One reason for the act requirement is the political danger
of giving government officials the power to punish individuals for thoughts
or propensities. 153 Limiting crimes to acts provides a clearer line of where
government power ends. As Herbert Packer put it, the act requirement
provides a locus poenitentiae, "a point of no return beyond which external
constraints may be imposed but before which the individual is free ....
Carlson contends that the police encouragement of crime undermines
the act requirement.' 55 He says that the act requirement "guarantees a
reasonable chance to avoid criminal penalties." 156 By contrast, he claims,
undercover operations fail to give "an individual full freedom to comply
with the law, and thereby [fail to] respect[] the individual's autonomy and
ability to avoid crime., 157 He concludes that the act requirement implies a
electronic surveillance, or interrogations were individually necessary. If any one tactic is
necessary to combat these crimes, it is as likely to be undercover operations as anything else.
151 See Carlson, supra note 69.
152 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2) (1962).
153 See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B. Stephan III, Defenses, Presumptions, and
Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1371 (1979).
154 HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMTNAL SANCTION 75 (1968).
155 See Carlson, supra note 69.
156 Id. at 1083.
157 Id. at 1086. Similarly, KATZ, supra note 77, at 155-64, states, "If I happen to know
that you, generally a very law-abiding citizen, will under some very special concatenation of
circumstances commit a criminal act, and I delude you into thinking that those circumstances
have come about, am I not punishing you for your disposition?" I would say not. Whenever
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very expansive entrapment defense, one that would ordinarily not permit
the government to punish an individual for encouraged conduct unless she
"initiated" the criminal act.1
58
Carlson's analysis may justify an entrapment defense, but one far
narrower than he imagines. Let's begin with the same comparison as
before. Exactly why does it not "undermine" the act requirement to allow
the government to punish the person who was privately encouraged into
crime by a "sincere" criminal? For example, when B encourages A to
exploit some once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to steal from her employer, we
do not think it is a dangerous power or a denial of individual autonomy to
let the government punish B for succumbing to this temptation. Why?
Here is the ordinary way to explain the legitimacy of this liability: A acted
voluntarily and without duress, and therefore chose to cross over the line
defined by the act requirement. Put differently, we treat A as having had the
power to say "no" to the criminal opportunity. Thus, the act requirement
still provides a zone of freedom by requiring an act which the defendant
chooses to perform.
Let me repeat that I realize that the fundamental assumptions of
criminal liability-like the defendant's ability to choose differently-are
contestable. My point is not that they are right, but to ask if they permit an
entrapment defense. Given current conceptions of individual responsibility,
then, the problem with Carlson's argument is that A has exactly the same
power to say "no" to a given criminal opportunity when it is offered by an
undercover agent. The act requirement is fully functional (as much as it
ever is) as long as the government offers only those temptations that already
exist in the world and for which we already punish the individuals who
succumb. We still do not punish individuals for mere thoughts or
propensities. We have redistributed criminal opportunities, but we have not
even moved the conduct line, much less abandoned the requirement of
conduct.
Carlson's argument might still justify a very limited entrapment
defense, one that forbids a government agent from creating temptations to
crime beyond anything that exists in the "real" world. Allowing the
government to exceed the best market offer does not literally undermine the
voluntary act requirement, because voluntariness is defined so narrowly.
But one might claim that this standard definition of voluntariness "works" if
the only temptations that individuals have to resist are equivalent to actual
you commit a crime, it is because circumstances have arisen in which it is your disposition is
to offend. However the circumstances arise, we punish you for acting in accordance with
your dispositions, not merely for having them.
158 Carlson, supra note 69, at 1096.
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ones, not anything that a government agent can dream up. Allowing the
government to encourage crime more strongly than any private actor does
really might render the act requirement insufficiently protective of
individual freedom. Thus, a concern for the proper allocation of power
may, just like economic theory, justify the minimalist entrapment defense,
one that limits the government to offering the kind of temptation that
otherwise exist in the world.
Thus, I conclude that existing rationales fail to justify any but the most
minimal of defenses. Perhaps, as Michael Seidman suggested almost a
quarter century ago, the entrapment defense is nothing more than an
example of class privilege.
III. RECONSTRUCTING A THEORY OF ENTRAPMENT: POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC RATIONALES FOR REGULATING UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS
In this Part, I seek to reconstruct the political/institutional and
economic rationales for regulating undercover operations. I do not view the
entrapment defense as a means of evaluating the individual defendant.
Instead, I claim that any defense makes sense only as a broad regulation
that seeks in the aggregate to minimize the political risk from granting
government the power to encourage crime and to maximize the crime
prevention benefits of this investment in law enforcement. Part A considers
a new institutional/political rationale and Part B revisits the economic
rationale. Finally, Part C discusses some implications of the two rationales.
A. RE-EXAMINING THE INSTITUTIONAL LOGIC OF THE DEFENSE: A
NEW UNDERSTANDING OF THE POLITICAL DANGERS OF
UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS
In this Part, I claim that a concern for the allocation of power justifies
a strong entrapment defense that does more than forbid government from
offering temptations greater than ever otherwise exist. What I seek to
provide is an exact explanation of the political danger of the undercover
tactic, the ways that the power to tempt others may be misappropriated by
governmental actors. The political threat has always been appreciated but
never, I contend, adequately explained.
I begin by describing in greater detail the existence of probabilistic
offenders, who arise because of the scarcity of criminal opportunities and
fluctuating preferences. I then explain the danger in giving government the
power to control the number and timing of otherwise scarce opportunities.
It is this: given scarcity, government can manipulate opportunities to make
it highly likely that an individual will commit undercover offenses despite
the fact that she is otherwise highly unlikely to offend.
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1. Scarce Opportunities and Fluctuating Preferences: The Fortuity of
Legal Compliance
If an individual's preferences and opportunities were fixed, then she
would routinely make the same decision about crime-to offend or not.
She would, in other words, be either a true or false offender. Probabilistic
offenders exist because preferences and opportunities fluctuate. An
individual who does not currently offend may do so when her lawful
opportunities contract and/or her criminal opportunities expand, the latter
occurring when she encounters a scarce but attractive criminal opportunity.
In addition, individual preferences may change over time. Thus, there is
great fortuity to an individual's legal compliance.
To explain, I offer a slightly more complex model for the decision to
offend. An individual commits a crime when the expected benefits (b)
exceed the expected costs, which (assuming risk neutrality) are equal to the
product of the probability of detection (p) times the formal and informal
sanctions if detected (s), plus the other expected costs of crime (c), that is,
when b > ps + c.159 Let us focus on the common context for undercover
operations, which is black market crimes. When the crime is one of selling
(e.g., drugs, arson services, official favors), the individual's benefit from
crime is the exchange price. Thus, she must receive a price at least as large
as her perceived costs of crime, which constitute her reservation price for
committing the offense. An individual offends when the illegal market's
equilibrium price rises above her reservation price. 1
60
Now consider the source of probabilistic offenders. The primary cause
is a change in an individual's opportunities. Of greatest importance,
criminal opportunities can be scarce in at least five ways. First, the
opportunity itself may be rare. For example, given the risks of punishment
for bribing public officials, there might be few bribe offers made in a given
time period, even to those willing to accept such offers. If so, those willing
to accept bribes are probabilistic offenders; the probability of their
offending is equal to the probability of their receiving one of the scarce
offers. Second, even if the criminal offer is not scarce, there might be very
few such offers made under circumstances where the risk of detection is, or
159 A more complex model would account for many additional factors. For example, one
might want to account for risk aversion, behavioral biases, and the discounting of future
costs and benefits.
160 Conversely, for crimes of buying, the exchange price (EP) is part of the other costs of
crime. The reservation price is an amount no more than the difference in the benefit and all
other costs of crime, so an individual offends only when EP < b - ps - c (where c here
excludes EP). The individual's reservation price is the maximum exchange price she will
tolerate and still commit the offense. An individual commits a crime of buying when the
illegal market's equilibrium price falls below the individual's reservation price.
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appears to be, low. For example, suppose workers are usually deterred
from hacking into their employer's bank accounts and transferring funds to
themselves but are willing to commit the crime in the highly unusual case
where they stumble upon the access codes. These are probabilistic
offenders. Third, the price may be scarce. Black markets for illegal goods
and services have high search costs, so that we expect a distribution of
prices around the mean, rather than a single price at which all trades occur.
Those willing to accept only an above-mean price are probabilistic.
Fourth, there may be scarce benefits from crime, such as the
opportunity to preserve or enhance a personal, romantic, or sexual
relationship. A person might turn down criminal offers of any monetary
price that ever occur in the market, but accept them in the highly unusual
case where one is asked to offend by a person whose relationship one
greatly values. An example might be Lively, 161 who plausibly would not
have sold cocaine for any reason other than the preservation of a romantic
relationship. 162 Similarly, even though Sorrells had just met the undercover
agent to whom he sold alcohol, he too might not have done so except for
the fact that he was doing a favor for someone he thought was a former
comrade-in-arms.' 
63
Fifth, there may be scarce opportunities to commit crime in
circumstances where informal sanctions-guilt or shame-are minimized.
A person might turn down criminal offers of any price that occurs in the
market, but accept them in the unusual case where there is a plausible and
scarce moral rationalization for it. In Sherman v. United States,164 for
example, the defendant might have refused to acquire and supply heroin in
any circumstance except when asked by a person who seems to be suffering
painful withdrawal symptoms. In two of the ABSCAM cases, it is possible
that two politicians accepted bribes only because the undercover operative
promised that their refusal would block construction plans that would
161 See State v. Lively, 921 P.2d 1035, 1038 (Wash. 1996), discussed in the introduction.
162 The exploitation of such relationships is not as rare as one might expect. See, e.g.,
United States v. Poehlman, 217 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing entrapment claim to sex
crime involving children where defendant's initial interest was a relationship with the adult
woman portrayed on-line by the undercover agent who proposed the crime); United States v.
Moseley, 496 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1974) (discussing entrapment claim where defendant
claimed to have sexual relationship with undercover informant who induced him to sell
heroin to an undercover agent); Labensky v. County of Nassau, 6 F. Supp. 2d 161 (E.D.N.Y.
1998) (discussing entrapment claim where male undercover informant developed close
friendship with female defendant over a period of several months). See generally Kuo,
supra note 118.
163 See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 452 (1932).
'6 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
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benefit the politicians' constituents. 165 If so, these were probabilistic
offenders.
In addition to scarce criminal opportunities, a person's willingness to
offend will change with fluctuations in her lawful opportunities. For
example, the value a person places on the proceeds from selling contraband
will vary with changes in the individual's lawful opportunities for
generating income. An individual unwilling to take a criminal offer at time
one may be willing to take the same offer at time two because in the interim
the individual loses her job.
Finally, holding opportunities constant, an individual might be a
probabilistic offender because her preferences change. From a
psychological standpoint, short-term changes in mood and emotion can
affect moral reasoning,1 66 which can influence the decision to commit a
crime. From an economic standpoint, an individual's decision to offend
depends on her willingness to take risks (exchanging a high probability of a
criminal gain for a low probability of sanctions) and the degree to which
she values the future (when sanctions may be imposed) compared to the
present (when she reaps the benefits of crime). Emotion and mood may
affect both risk-taking and future-orientation.1 67 As another example, many
crimes require trust between multiple parties and one's willingness to trust
others may depend on mood or emotion. 168 In all cases, one's probability of
offending is equal to the probability that one obtains a criminal opportunity,
scarce in any dimension, during a time in which her mood favors accepting
the opportunity.
With this understanding of probabilistic offenders, we can now better
understand the extent of the power government officials wield when they
control undercover operations.
165 See MARX, supra note 29, at 131-32; see also United States v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d
1403, 1419 & n.21 (10th Cir. 1990) (discussing need for entrapment instruction when
undercover agent told defendant she was suicidal and needed money desperately).
166 See, e.g., Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Does Mood Influence Moral Judgment? An
Empirical Test with Legal and Policy Implications, 29 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 1 (2005);
Fataneh Zarinpoush et al., The Effects of Happiness and Sadness on Moral Reasoning, 29 J.
MORAL EDUC. 397 (2000).
167 Robert Cooter offers a formal model in which mood changes cause an individual's
preferences for risk and futurity to fluctuate over time, so that an individual who usually
resists criminal temptations will on occasion lapse into crime. See Robert D. Cooter, Lapses,
Conflict, and Akrasia in Torts and Crimes: Towards an Economic Theory of the Will, 11
INT'L REv. L. & EcoN. 149 (1991).
168 Cf Michael Kosfeld et al., Oxytocin Increases Trust in Humans, 435 NATURE 673
(2005).
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2. The Power of Undercover Operations: Manipulating the Fortuity of
Legal Compliance
I previously discounted other commentators' concerns about the
political dangers of undercover operations by observing that an individual
can refuse an offer to commit a crime. If this ability to refuse a criminal
offer is sufficient to justify punishment when the offer comes from a sincere
private party, why is it insufficient when the offer comes from an
undercover police agent? Now we are in a position to see the answer.
Undercover operations give the police the power to control the fortuity
of legal compliance: the power to make scarce criminal opportunities
plentiful, the power to control the timing of criminal opportunities, and the
power to repeatedly offer opportunities so as to maximize the probability of
finding the target at the time when she is most willing to offend. An
example of all three manipulations is Lively: the opportunity was scarce
because it appeared that selling cocaine was important to maintaining a
romantic relationship; the timing was during Lively's divorce and soon
after her suicide attempt; some evidence suggested that the informant Desai
made repeated efforts to persuade Lively to do it. 169  All three
circumstances occur in the real world. Yet without limiting the police
power to manipulate the fortuities of offending, undercover operations
represent a politically dangerous amount of power. Government officials
could easily use this power to target their political enemies and convenient
scapegoats.
To be specific, a key danger is the power of repetition. The probability
that the police induce an individual to offend depends not only on the
scarcity of the opportunity they create, but on the number of times they
supply it. Offering more opportunities creates a greater probability of
catching the person at a time when her reservation price (as a seller) is low
enough to accept the undercover offer. If police may repeatedly offer to the
same probabilistic offender a high inducement that occurs only
infrequently, they can make it highly likely that individuals will commit
undercover offenses despite the fact that they are otherwise highly unlikely
to offend. The police can create circumstances in which a nearly harmless
individual will almost certainly offend in an undercover operation, even if
they limit their offers to the highest levels that exist in the actual markets.
To illustrate, suppose that (1) the probability that A will receive a very
high bribe in a year is 0.1%; (2) the conditional probability A will accept the
very high bribe when offered is 20% (because of variation in lawful
opportunities or mood); and (3) the probability A will accept anything lower
169 State v. Lively, 921 P.2d 1035, 1036 (Wash. 1996).
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than the very high bribe is 0%. As a result, the probability that A will
accept a bribe during a year is .02% and A's expected number of offenses
during fifty years (before and after which the probability is, say, zero) is
only .01. Nonetheless, the police can cause A to take one bribe, on
average, by offering her the very high bribe on five separate occasions. 
70
Perhaps the more relevant fact is that the probability of A's offending at
least once during any of the five undercover operations is now 6 7%.17 1 By
offering the best market opportunity repeatedly, the police can make it
substantially likely that an individual we would ordinarily call law-abiding
will offend, increasing the probability from a probability of .02% to a
probability of 67%! Bear in mind that these numbers assume the
government has no information from which it could predict when A would
be most likely to offend. But if A's reservation price fluctuates with
observable factors, (e.g., financial distress, 172 addiction, or intoxication 173)
then the government would not need as many tries to generate the same
high probability that A will offend.
174
A primary purpose of institutional restraints on government is to
prevent this kind of raw power. Outside of undercover operations, where
government does not control the criminal opportunity, its power is limited
to punishing the few individuals who happen to receive scarce offers,
repeated or not, and then succumb.175 Giving the government the power to
170 Each high price offer produces .2 expected offenses so that five offers produce one
expected offense.
171 Each time she is offered the high inducement, her chance of rejecting it is .8. Her
chance of rejecting it five consecutive times is (.8 x .8 x .8 x.8 x .8) = .33. Thus, her chance
of not rejecting it all five times is .67.
172 For example, the F.B.I. targeted John DeLorean for a drug sting when he was on the
verge of a bankruptcy in which he would lose his car company. See MARX, supra note 29, at
10; see also United States v. Kessee, 992 F.2d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing
entrapment where defendant claimed he had lost his job and needed money for food and rent
during undercover operation).
173 See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 997 F.2d 812 (10th Cir. 1993) (upholding
conviction for arranging a cocaine sale where undercover agents paid the defendant, an
addict, with cocaine instead of cash).
174 This analysis is conservative in that it assumes that people are generally free of the
problems of impulsiveness, except in special circumstances like intoxication. Yet the
literature on bounded rationality includes a large component on the problem of
impulsiveness or "time inconsistent preferences," which may make individuals generally
susceptible to being seduced to act against their long term interest. See, e.g., GEORGE
AINSLIE, BREAKDOWN OF WILL (2001); TIME AND DECISION: ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON 1NTERTEMPORAL CHOICE (George Loewenstein, Daniel Read & Roy F.
Baumeister eds., 2003).
175 This distinction answers Dillof, supra note 76, at 867, who says, "There is no reason
to distinguish the constitutionality of selective prosecution on the one hand and selective
investigation/entrapment on the other." To the contrary, as shown above, the dangers of
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control the criminal opportunity will, for some crimes, allow it to select a
potentially large part of the population that it can then induce into crime.
The formal ability to refuse criminal opportunities is no longer sufficient to
prevent arbitrary government action. In effect, if undercover operations are
unregulated, government officials have the ability to impose serious
criminal sanctions on almost anyone they want.'
1 76
Seidman objects to this kind of argument by claiming that government
officials already possess the power to arbitrarily select and punish
individuals at will.' 77 This is a serious point. Most obviously, when it
comes to many minor crimes, especially traffic offenses, enforcement is a
matter of selecting a few individuals to punish for what virtually everyone
does. Over the decades since Seidman wrote, the tendency of legislatures to
arbitrary and discriminatory law enforcement are distinctly greater when the government
need not wait for the defendant to offend. Of course, one could try to address the problem
through a reformulated selective prosecution doctrine for this context, but I reject that
solution at infra text accompanying note 189.
176 Diloff, supra note 76, at 864, objects to this "civil rights" rationale for entrapment,
stating: "There is no record of entrapment's having been employed as a weapon against
those the government disfavors." He acknowledges that the current entrapment defense
might account for this record, but counters that the police are probably not deterred by the
defense because it only requires restoration of the "status quo ante" rather than punishment.
Id. at 865. To the contrary, however, the law enforcement official who targets a political
enemy runs a risk that the public will see the targeting for what it is and punish the relevant
incumbents electorally. Without the entrapment defense, the risk that such targeting will
"backfire" is very low because the public cannot discern law enforcement motive and every
politically adverse defendant will claim to be a political victim. With the defense, however,
there is a much greater risk the jury will acquit in cases of political targeting, which would
give the defendant greater credibility in attacking the political motivations of incumbent
officials. So the defense serves as a significant barrier to political abuse.
Moreover, Diloff's observation that there is no known case of political abuse may only
illustrate the difficulty of discovering the police motive for targeting an individual. Given a
similar difficulty with proving discriminatory intent, the federal courts have apparently
discovered only one case of racially selective prosecution in the past hundred years. See
Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the Pitfalls of
Armstrong, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 605, 615-16 (1998) (stating that since Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1886), the only federal case dismissing a criminal charge on such grounds is
People v. Ochoa, 212 Cal. Rptr. 4 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)). In any event, there are some
suspicious undercover operations, such as the F.B.I.'s 1983 effort to ensnare the politically
controversial Al Sharpton in a drug sale. See, e.g., Marc Santora, Sharpton Says F.B.I. Tape
of Drug Offer Distorts Truth, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 24, 2002, at A19. Sharpton refused, but the
surveillance videotape surfaced in 2002 during Sharpton's run for the Democratic
Presidential nomination. Id. The scandal over the operation in Tulia, Texas, see supra note
28, raises the possibility of racial targeting, as does a recent operation in Georgia that netted
many Indian immigrants. See Kate Zernike, Cultural and Language Differences Are
Complicating Drug Sting in Georgia, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2005, at A 16.
177 See Seidman, supra note 15, at 146.
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enact over-broad offenses has given prosecutors increasing discretion for
more serious crimes as well.
78
Nonetheless, we have not quite reached the point where prosecutors
and police possess so much discretion that it is no longer worth worrying
about giving them more. For serious offenses, there is less enforcement
discretion both because it is more difficult to prove that a random American
has committed a serious crime and more difficult for law enforcement to
resist the political pressure to prosecute everyone known to have committed
a serious offense. Thus, if government officials with limited resources
decide to "target" an unpopular individual, they can easily convict him of
traffic offenses and other minor crimes, but not of crimes equivalent to
accepting a bribe or selling cocaine. By contrast, the power to manipulate
criminal opportunities in undercover operations may induce the commission
of the very kind of serious offenses that carry a real threat of significant
incarceration.
In any event, limiting discretion remains a basic institutional
commitment, motivating various other doctrines. 179  If police already
possess so much discretion that it would not matter if we gave them more,
then we must rethink much more than the entrapment defense.
B. RE-EXAMINING THE ECONOMIC LOGIC OF THE DEFENSE: THE
"PROXY" CRIME IDEA AND A MORE COMPLEX BALANCING
In Part II, I objected to the economic theory of entrapment for two
reasons. I first accepted the premises of the argument-that the purpose of
the defense is to exculpate false offenders-and observed that it is
extremely difficult to determine whether the undercover offender is false
unless the government incurs investigative costs the undercover operation is
supposed to avoid. Second, I challenged the argument's premise by
identifying a large category of probabilistic offenders whose punishment
creates some positive benefit.
This section answers each objection, though in reverse order. First, I
defend the premise of the economic rationale: that we need to regulate
undercover operations to avoid an acute waste of law enforcement
resources. The benefit of apprehending and punishing probabilistic
offenders varies widely, but police have insufficient incentives to account
for these differences. Second, I recast the purpose of undercover
operations. I conclude that we should not try to determine whether the
178 See Stuntz, supra note 111.
179 E.g., the principle of legality, act requirement, and vagueness doctrine, all serve this
purpose. See PACKER, supra note 154; Jeffries, supra note 135.
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defendant is an "otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his own
devices, likely would never have run afoul of the law., 180 We will rarely
know in any precise way or beyond a reasonable doubt whether the
defendant is such a person, and it is not worth the cost of trying to find out
in each case. We should instead ask whether a particular tactic will, in the
aggregate, yield many nearly harmless, low-risk offenders, in which case
the entrapment defense should bar convictions from such tactics.
1. Reconstructing the Economic Rationale: A Collective Cost/Benefit
Analysis
The existence of probabilistic offenders does not eliminate the
likelihood that police will waste resources on unproductive operations.
Even though there is some benefit to punishing probabilistic offenders,
society has a greater need to apprehend and punish true offenders than
probabilistic offenders, and within the latter category, a stronger need to
punish those whose probability of offense is close to one ("high risk
probabilistic offenders") than to punish those whose probability of offense
is close to zero ("low risk probabilistic offenders"). Like the punishment of
false offenders, punishing probabilistic offenders who are extremely
unlikely to offend-whose reservation price for crime is almost always
higher than any offer they receive-is extraordinarily wasteful. The
analysis becomes messier, but there are two reasons to believe that the costs
will very frequently outweigh the benefits.
First, when we talk of probabilistic offenders, we include individuals
whose probability of offense is so low that the mere costs of their
apprehension and punishment exceed any benefit. Suppose the probability
that A will commit crime X this year is one in a hundred thousand (because
the odds of A receiving an extremely scarce offer at the time she would
accept it are so low). There are some individual prevention benefits from
her punishment if it would drive the probability of her offending down from
.00001 to 0. Punishment may also uniquely raise the level of general
deterrence for those in her situation. Although such people commit very
few crimes (100,000 such individuals commit, on average, one crime per
year), their deterrence is not entirely valueless. But we can easily imagine
that the deterrence and incapacitation benefits just described are far smaller
than the cost of running the undercover operation that apprehends her and
the costs of her incarceration, to herself as well as the state.18"'
180 Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 553-54 (1992).
181 Economists tend to count the costs of punishment to the criminal in their analyses,
though there are some dissenters from this practice. In the entrapment case, it certainly
seems appropriate to demand that the total benefits to punishment exceed the total costs.
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Second, law enforcement resources being scarce, resources used to
apprehend low-risk probabilistic offenders are wastefully diverted from
apprehending true and high-risk probabilistic offenders. Punishing the
former buys far less deterrence or incapacitation than punishing the latter.
For both reasons, and because police incentives are skewed, it makes sense
to bar conviction of those who take an undercover inducement they would
be extraordinarily unlikely to receive in the real world, even if there is some
small, positive probability that they would.
To illustrate, assume police choose between an undercover operation
that offers extremely attractive inducements that rarely occur and yields
twenty arrests per day and an operation that offers ordinary inducements
that frequently occur and yields one arrest per day. The police will choose
the former operation, which apprehends many low-risk probabilistic
offenders, while the latter would yield one true or high-risk offender.
When given the twenty offenders, the prosecutor can choose not to
prosecute, which means the police resources were wasted. Or she could
choose to prosecute all twenty, which means she diverts resources from
other prosecutions, and for nineteen of the cases, the diversion is almost
certainly wasteful. The same is true of punishment resources if
incarceration is involved. Sending all twenty offenders to prison may
require either that we do not incarcerate more dangerous offenders for that
time, or that we incarcerate each of the twenty for 1/20th of the time we
could incarcerate the one high value offender if she were the only offender.
Either choice diverts punishment resources away from their best use. 182
In sum, the mere fact that there are benefits to punishing a probabilistic
offender does not mean that those benefits exceed the costs. Instead, we
have reason to worry that police will prefer tactics that yield high numbers
of low value arrests to tactics that yield low numbers of high value arrests.
An entrapment defense or other regulation may offset the agency problems
that cause police to waste scarce resources "stinging" false or low risk
probabilistic offenders.
2. "Proxy" Offenses and Undercover Operations
To address my other criticism-about the difficulty of proving the
defendant is a true (or a high-risk probabilistic) offender beyond a
reasonable doubt-we must further revise the economic theory. Here I
introduce the idea of a "proxy" crime to argue that we should focus on the
182 An ideally motivated prosecutor might want to select among the twenty cases,
prosecuting only the one true offender. But she may be unable to tell which one of the
twenty is worth prosecuting. Even when she can, the police resources rounding up nineteen
are wasted.
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general strength of the correlation between internal and external acts, not
the harm caused or danger posed by a particular defendant.
a. The Theory of "Proxy" Crime
Economic theory views criminal law as serving to prevent behavior
that causes net social harm. The theory applies most readily when the
prohibited behavior is defined as including the social harm to be prevented.
The crime of homicide, for example, requires the element "death of
another." Most crimes, however, define behaviors that only risk harm.
Common law larceny need not cause harm because the taken property may
be returned without being missed or damaged, but given the mental state
required (intent to permanently deprive another of her property), it usually
does.
By contrast, some crimes prohibit behavior that neither causes nor
inherently risks harm. For example, in some states, the crime of electronic
eavesdropping bars the recording of oral communications without the
consent of all parties to them,' 83 as where one party to a conversation
records it without the consent of other participants. But one does not
inevitably risk harm by recording a conversation without consent. The
recording itself does not violate the privacy of another when the recorder
participated in the conversation and knows what was said. And because the
statute does not require an intent to use the recording in any particular way,
one cannot say the recording inherently risks harm. Even if the recorder
discloses the recording, if the content is banal, it still risks no harm.
Finally, when the non-consensual recording contains damaging information,
the state could reach the risky behavior by banning only the disclosure, the
intent to disclose, or the threat to disclose the recording. The crime reaches
this behavior, but it is also criminalizes the recording itself with no such
intent-a combination of act and mental state that does not itself risk harm.
Many crimes have this feature. 184 I call them "proxy" crimes because
the behavior prohibited, while not inherently risking harm, stands in for
'8' See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-2 (West 2005).
184 Consider two federal examples. First, the law compels certain individuals to report
transactions involving more than $10,000 in cash and authorizes prison for knowing
violations. See 18 U.S.C. § 1960 (2000). Though the report may prompt government to
discover an underlying crime (e.g., drug dealing or tax fraud) the failure to report does not
inevitably risk harm to law enforcement. Sometimes individuals use cash for innocent
reasons and sometimes the government is already tracking an individual's money. Second,
the law prohibits felons from possessing firearms. See id. § 922(g). Putting aside the
unlikely possibility that Congress believed ex-felons were more likely to have firearm
accidents, the apparent aim of this offense is to prevent felons from committing crimes with
guns, but it is no defense to possess a gun without the intent to offend.
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behavior that does risk harm. 185 Indeed, frequently the origin of a proxy
crime is a modification of a pre-existing offense where the defined conduct
did inherently risk harm. The legislature decides, however, that it is
difficult for a prosecutor to prove all the elements of the standard crime, so
they remove certain hard-to-prove elements, including the ones that
produced a necessary risk of harm. 86 The result is a prophylactic crime,
that bars conduct that neither causes nor risks harm but is correlated with
other conduct that is harmful or risky.
We can understand better the utilitarian logic of the proxy offense in
the context of another example. Many states prohibit driving a motor
vehicle while there is an open or unsealed container of alcohol in the
passenger area.' 87 The driver is guilty even if she is completely sober, has
not consumed any of the "possessed" alcohol, and lacks the intent to
consume any alcohol. The driver is guilty even though a passenger holds
the can of beer and intends to consume it entirely. Given that mere access
to alcohol does not inherently risk harm, why punish it?
Retributivists would probably not punish this behavior, but utilitarian
balancing may justify doing so. The prohibition will decrease the presence
of open alcohol containers in cars. Some of the alcohol in those containers
would have been consumed by the drivers. Some of those drivers would
have become intoxicated. Thus, the statute decreases drunk driving and
ultimately the harm of accidents. The precise benefit of the open container
ban is the ability to generate this risk reduction more cheaply (or to generate
incrementally more reduction for the same cost) than occurs when the
legislature relies only on more vigorous enforcement of the drunk driving
ban. The key is that an open container does not itself prove the drunk
driving offense beyond a reasonable doubt. If it did, there would be no
advantage to the new law because, whenever the police found an open
container, the state could convict for drunk driving (which would also deter
185 Jeremy Bentham used the term "presumed offenses." See Principles of the Penal
Code, book 4, chap. 15, in THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 425-27 (Richard Hildreth from
Etienne Dumont trans., C.K. Ogden, ed., (1931)). For an excellent discussion and more
examples, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 224-32
(2003).
186 See Stuntz, supra note 111, at 519-23, 529-33.
187 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS: THE SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 104-05 (2002) lists forty-two states with open container laws.
See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.284 (West 2005) ("A driver of a motor vehicle upon a
public street or highway shall not possess in the passenger area of the motor vehicle an open
or unsealed bottle, can, jar, or other receptacle containing an alcoholic beverage."); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 2112-A(2) (2005) ("The operator of a vehicle on a public way is in
violation of this section if the operator or a passenger in the passenger area of the vehicle: A.
Consumes alcohol; or B. Possesses an open alcoholic beverage container.").
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open container possession). The advantage of the proxy approach is
precisely that, while there is a correlation between the harmful act (drunk
driving) and the proxy (driving with open container), it is not so strong as to
be beyond a reasonable doubt. The cost of the law is the forgone value that
individuals place on carrying open containers. 8  Quite possibly, the
benefits exceed the costs.
The proxy approach shows that there is no connection between
burdens of proof and the probability of the harm the law is meant to
prevent. The criminal elements the legislature defines must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt, but the legislature's judgment that the criminal
conduct is correlated with harm or risk need not be proved by any such
standard. The prosecutor need not prove beyond a reasonable doubt or by
any other standard that by virtue of the open container the driver risked a
traffic accident, would have become intoxicated while driving, or would
have consumed any alcohol. The open container is only dangerous when
combined with other driver intent or conduct-to consume alcohol and
keep driving-but the legislature defines the crime to omit those additional
elements.
One might ask: for a proxy crime, why is there not a defense of being
one of the individuals to whom the correlation does not apply? Why not
allow a harmlessness defense to the open container law, whereby a
defendant driver claims that he was not in danger of becoming legally
intoxicated? The answer is that this requires the government to undertake
the expense of proving the very fact the proxy offense is supposed to
obviate. One might think the solution is to put the burden of proof on the
defendant (assuming that is constitutionally permissible). But even there,
the state will have to incur the expense of investigating and refuting the
defendant's evidence. The defendant may easily raise the defense by
testifying that she was not consuming alcohol from the open container, or
was consuming it but was in no danger of becoming intoxicated, or was
perhaps nearly intoxicated but was just about to arrive at her destination.
The whole point of a proxy crime is to avoid having to rebut these sorts of
claims.
Again, I am not trying to prove this sort of prohibition is ultimately
justified, but only to note that this proxy structure is common to criminal
statutes and to point out a possible utilitarian justification. To deter certain
harmful conduct, the legislature defines as criminal some broad set of
conduct that is easily proved but not inherently risky because the benefits of
188 That cost is obviously small. It consists of the cost of deferring consumption, as by
abandoning poured drinks when one decides to ride in a car or abandoning a car ride when
one decides to pour a drink.
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deterring the subset of behavior that is risky outweighs the costs of
deterring the subset that is not.
b. Using the Proxy Concept to Explain Entrapment
The proxy analysis helps to explain both the logic of undercover
operations and of an entrapment defense. First, the reason for the tactic: we
punish individuals for undercover offenses because doing so contributes in
a general way to crime prevention-deterring external offenses and
incapacitating external offenders-not because we believe a particular
undercover offender has externally offended beyond a reasonable doubt.
Recall that there would be no need for a proxy crime if the act defining the
crime (e.g., access to an open container) proved a more serious crime (e.g.,
drunk driving) beyond a reasonable doubt. Similarly, there is no need for
the undercover act, by itself or with other evidence, to prove an external
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. If it did, there would be no need to
punish an internal offense because we could punish for the external one.
Instead, there is a net benefit from many undercover operations merely
because some apprehended individuals are true or high-risk offenders and
the operation facilitates their deterrence and incapacitation.
Second, we nonetheless require some regulation of undercover
operations, such as the entrapment defense. Just as the value of a proxy
offense depends on the strength of the overall correlation between the proxy
act and an act that inherently causes or risks harm, the value of a particular
undercover operation depends on the strength of the overall correlation
between the internal and external offense. Because of a principal-agent
problem, police will frequently prefer undercover tactics with a weak
correlation that yield many arrests (because the manufactured temptation is
great) to tactics with a strong correlation that yield few arrests (because the
manufactured temptation is realistic). Thus, the entrapment defense is a
means of re-motivating police towards more productive undercover tactics,
avoiding the waste of less productive tactics.
To understand both points, consider a thought experiment. Suppose
that the legislature initially proclaims that its criminal prohibitions do not
apply to acts committed in undercover operations and forbids the police
from engaging in such operations.' 89 Thus, if unauthorized undercover
operations occur, the defendant's internal acts are not crimes. Against this
no-undercover baseline, suppose the legislature later decides to make
189 As soon as the police first attempt an undercover operation, suppose the legislature
enacts a statute that says something like the following: "Unless otherwise stated, all
provisions defining crimes require the acts to be committed without the encouragement or
participation of agents acting for the government in an undercover operation."
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exceptions, authorizing specific undercover operations for specific crimes
where conventional law enforcement is failing. Because current criminal
statutes do not apply to acts in undercover operations, the legislature enacts
parallel provisions prohibiting individuals from committing certain acts in
the authorized undercover operations (and authorizing punishment which
may or may not be the same as for the external offense). For example, the
legislature enacts a law authorizing police, under specified parameters, to
offer bribes to public officials and making it a crime to accept a bribe in
those authorized operations.
In this setting, consider our two normative questions. First, what
justifies the legislative decision to expand criminal liability to include acts
committed in authorized undercover operations? The answer is not that the
undercover offender externally offends beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead,
the legislature concludes that, in the parameters it specifies, there is a net
benefit from running undercover operations and punishing internal
offenders. The size of the crime prevention benefit depends on how many
of the undercover offenders are true, high-risk, low-risk, or false. Ideally,
the legislature enacts the new provisions because these benefits exceed the
costs.
The second question is whether we should recognize any exceptions to
the new criminal liability for offenses in authorized undercover operations.
Should we, for example, create a defense that exculpates a defendant who
would not have accepted a bribe outside of an undercover operation? As
matters are stated in the thought experiment, the answer is no. If the
legislature has authorized only specific undercover operations, has correctly
defined the operational parameters so as to account for the problem of false
and low-risk offenders, and the police have stayed within these parameters,
then it will not make sense to litigate in each case whether the defendant
would otherwise offend. If the legislature decides to punish, say, "the act of
accepting a bribe of ordinary size offered no more than twice by a stranger
in exchange for influencing a significant official decision," and the
prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant accepted a
bribe under these circumstances, that is the end of the matter.
Posner, Shavell, and Hay are correct to say that we do not generate any
useful deterrence or incapacitation when we punish a false offender.190 But
that is just like saying that we do not generate crime prevention benefits
when the individual with an open alcohol container in her car would not
have become legally intoxicated while driving. The proxy strategy directs
us away from such case-by-case judgments. As long as the legislature
190 See Hay, supra note 96; Posner, supra note 96; Shavell, supra note 75.
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made the appropriate utilitarian calculation in allowing the undercover
operations the police actually used, then there is no need for individual
reconsideration. 191  There need be no "harmlessness" defense. This is
definitely the sharp edge of utilitarian thinking about criminal law-
sacrificing the few for the good of the many 192-but, again, my point is that
the objections to it are not unique to undercover operations.
We can now understand better, however, our present need for an
entrapment defense or other regulation. Contrary to the thought
experiment, legislatures have neither defined specific circumstances in
which police may use the undercover tactic nor defined crimes specific to
the circumstances of undercover offending. Legislatures have failed to set
specific limits on undercover tactics, much less to specify what tactics are
permitted for what offenses. As a result, the only way we have to test the
utilitarian benefits of an undercover operation is through a general, ex post
regulation-the entrapment defense. At a minimum, we need the
entrapment defense to ensure, not that each defendant is a true or high-risk
offender, but that the internal acts are, in general, sufficiently correlated
with external acts that the benefits of punishing internal acts exceed the
costs.
In sum, once we reformulate the economic rationale, we have, along
with the political rationale, a second justification for the entrapment
defense. The economic function is to correct a principal-agent problem that
would otherwise waste resources on unproductive operations likely to
apprehend and punish false and low-risk probabilistic offenders.
C. THE EXPLANATORY STRENGTH OF THE TWO RATIONALES
As a final test of these theories, we should examine how they stand up
to the critique of existing literature I provided in Part II. The reconstructed
rationales for the entrapment defense, political and economic, answer my
191 To make the analogy to proxy offenses complete, legislatures that punish a driver's
access to open containers of alcohol in the passenger area also specify exemptions to which
the legislature believes the proxy analysis is no longer persuasive. For example, Maine
allows open containers of alcohol in the passenger area if it is possessed and consumed by a
passenger "in the living quarters of a motor home" or a limousine. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 29A § 2112-A(3) (2005). Outside of such specified exceptions, the legislature
intends the prohibition to apply without regard to the actual risk of harm the defendant
posed.
192 Interestingly, however, this utilitarian balancing does not necessarily offend
retributivism. For reasons stated above, those who offend in undercover operations are
blameworthy. For retributivists who view blame as necessary to but not requiring
punishment, we may choose not to punish for consequential reasons, and the entrapment
defense merely screens out those defendants whose punishment is least likely to produce a
desirable result.
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earlier critique and explain much about the broad parameters of the defense.
Initially, the economic and political theories avoid the main objection to a
retributive or institutional fairness theory. Recall that the latter are unable
to explain why we have a defense for yielding to criminal temptations
created by police undercover agents but not those created by sincere private
criminals. The economic and political rationales justify the distinction. It
is only in the undercover operation that police and other government
officials can abuse political power and waste public resources. Moreover,
the law already supplies a strong disincentive to private citizens who
sincerely propose criminal transactions-punishment for solicitation and
conspiracy, as well as complicity in the encouraged offense. But, as
explained above, the law otherwise gives insufficient incentive to
government agents to limit undercover encouragement of crime; the
entrapment defense improves matters by removing the law enforcement
gain from overzealous or wasteful sting operations.
193
The economic and political rationales also explain some overlooked
but fundamental parameters of the entrapment defense. Note that, in
addition to the two categories of criminal offers just discussed-those
proposed by (1) sincere private citizens and (2) insincere government
agents-there are two other possibilities: (3) a government official acting
on his own behalf makes a sincere criminal offer and (4) an insincere
private citizen makes a criminal offer to an individual she seeks to entrap
and expose to criminal liability. For a fairness theory that turns on the
public/private distinction-identifying unfairness whenever public officials
greatly alter one's criminal temptations-the implication is the need to
extend the entrapment defense to any governmental offer, even sincere
ones. For a fairness theory that turns on the insincerity of the criminal
tempter-identifying unfairness whenever the unusually attractive criminal
offer is intended to bring criminal sanctions against the target-the
implication is the need to extend the defense to any insincere offer, even
private ones. Yet, as a matter of positive law, there is no defense in either
case. Private citizens who conspire with government officials actually
engaged in crime have no special "blame the government" defense. And
there is no "private entrapment defense" for a defendant encouraged into
crime by a private citizen intending to expose her to criminal liability.
194
193 In addition, unlike the fairness theories I critiqued, the political and economic
rationales do not imply that the status quo distribution of criminal temptations is fair. See
supra Part II.C. 1.
194 See sources cited supra note 77.
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The political and economic theories justify these results.'95 The
economic rationale is not implicated except when government officials
expend public resources on sting operations. These resources are not
employed if government officials are committing actual crimes nor if
private parties run their own sting operations. The political rationale is
implicated only when government actors who wield other great power also
wield the power to tempt their enemies without themselves facing criminal
sanctions. Government actors proposing actual crimes do face criminal
sanctions. 196 Private actors running sting operations do not pose the same
political dangers as public officials. In addition, to the extent we want to
deter private sting operations, we usually do so by imposing criminal
liability on private parties who encourage crimes (via solicitation,
conspiracy, and complicity).
Finally, although there is a scholarly elegance to theories that explain a
legal doctrine with a single function, there is at least one virtue in
explaining entrapment doctrine with two. Together, the political and
economic rationales answer one of Seidman's criticisms of entrapment. He
observes that different critics inconsistently complain both about the
government's random targeting of individuals and its deliberate selection of
targets. Rather than being evidence of the doctrine's incoherence, however,
these opposing criticisms are evidence of entrapment's dual justifications.
Deliberate targeting presents the danger of political abuse, that government
officials are inappropriately motivated to destroy the life of the individual
targeted. Random targeting presents the risk of wasted resources, given the
false positive paradox discussed above. 19 7 Neither outcome is inevitable:
195 Thus, I disagree with Allen, Luttrell & Kreeger, supra note 77, at 420-21, who argue
for creating a private entrapment defense. They claim that there is no benefit to punishing
someone who accepts an "extra-market" inducement. But if a private individual offers an
above-average inducement, it is, by definition, part of the market. See id. at 421 (recognizing
but dismissing this point). As explained supra in Part II.B.2.b, in black markets, scarce
opportunities arise at particularly attractive prices; failing to punish these crimes would
undermine deterrence.
196 An entrapment defense would undermine this deterrent by making it easier for
government criminals to find private accomplices who would enjoy the defense. Moreover,
the private actors government officials usually conspire with are their friends and we do not
worry about officials abusing political power to harm their friends.
197 See supra text accompanying notes 124-25. The problem is that, even if the false
positive rate is quite low, the false positive paradox shows that many or most of those
apprehended may be false offenders. Of course, this concern is lessened by the proxy
analysis discussed supra Part III.B.2. That reasoning suggests why we may want to convict
the individual of the internal offense even though we do not believe beyond a reasonable
doubt that they have committed an external offense. Nonetheless, we require some
correlation between the internal and external offense and there remains reason to worry that
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deliberate targeting is politically unobjectionable when officials act for
good reasons; random targeting is productive when officials use sufficiently
modest inducements. Thus, an entrapment defense (or other regulation)
should leave room for both random and deliberate targeting. But each form
of targeting does raise one of the two concerns that motivate the defense, so
there is nothing incoherent in worrying about both.
In sum, we need the entrapment defense or some equivalent regulation.
The next Part recommends particular doctrinal formulations derived from
the above analysis.
IV. HOW TO REGULATE TEMPTATION OPERATIONS: NEW CONCEPTS OF
ENTRAPMENT
Given the economic and political theories, how should we regulate
undercover operations? There are many possibilities. First best is
presumably some institutional solution to the agency problems that underlie
both concerns with undercover operations. In keeping with the tenor of the
normative discussion, however, I assume the existence of the basic structure
of police and prosecutorial bureaucracy. I therefore explore the parameters
of judicial regulation, primarily the issue of how courts can identify
unproductive or politically threatening operations. I recommend that courts
block prosecutions founded on such operations by granting an entrapment
defense or, as is done elsewhere, by enjoining prosecution or excluding
evidence of the undercover offense. 198 I do not comment on the choice
among these mechanisms,' 99 but address only the central question of how to
distinguish good from bad undercover operations. For ease of exposition, I
refer to the means of blocking a prosecution as a "defense," though that
should always be understood to include the alternatives of enjoining
prosecution or excluding evidence.
I offer two answers. Part A sketches a stark departure from the
existing approach: that we define the entrapment defense on a crime-by-
crime basis. This regulatory form would tie the legal doctrine most closely
to the economic and political rationales, but I discuss it only briefly because
it is complex and, as a practical matter, less likely to influence policy. In
police will pursue unproductive operations where the correlation is too low. Random
targeting heightens this concern.
198 See supra notes 20-22.
t99 An important issue is whether the judge or jury applies the doctrine I describe below.
If the jury should do so, then the choice of mechanism matters because the jury could decide
only the issue of a criminal defense. However, because the economic and political concerns
transcend the individual case, it seems to me that judges are the more appropriate decision-
maker, in which case any of the three mechanisms works.
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Part B, I return to the conventional, if second (or third) best approach, a
one-size-fits-all-crimes entrapment defense.
A. BRIEF NOTES ON A RADICAL ALTERNATIVE: CRIME-SPECIFIC
ENTRAPMENT DEFENSES
Academic discussion of entrapment assumes that the best doctrinal
formulation is uniform across crimes. It is obvious that the proper
application of an ideal doctrine may vary by crime, but almost no one
advocates that the definition of entrapment should depend on the crime.
Yet the first thing to note about the economic and political rationales is that
they raise different concerns for different crimes.
Consider first the political rationale-the need to deny government
officials the power to induce political enemies and unpopular individuals to
offend.20 0 Not every crime presents this danger. Almost everyone would
resist any offer involving sex with young children, so that undercover
operations involving this crime are not useful for "setting up" particular
individuals. The political threat arises most clearly for crimes that a large
majority of the population would commit if repeatedly offered an especially
attractive inducement. Identifying such crimes is an intensely empirical
issue, but I speculate that they include employee pilferage, insurance fraud,
failure to return lost property, copyright violations, knowingly passing
counterfeit bills, knowingly selling legal goods in exchange for drug
proceeds, and the illegal distribution of prescription painkillers or medicinal
marijuana. If my judgment appears misanthropic, consider that an
"especially attractive inducement" includes creating situations where the
crime appears necessary to preserve a romantic relationship (e.g., Lively2 1)
or to prevent the suffering of others (e.g., Sherman20 2), as well as cases
where the apparent victim seems highly unsympathetic (e.g., a heartless
insurance company).
There may also be a political danger to undercover operations
involving crimes that only a small minority would ever commit, if there are
many such crimes and the police can identify which crimes are tempting to
which individuals. The concern here is that "everybody has their
weakness." If government officials can readily ascertain an individual's
"weakness" and match it to a particular offense, they may be able to induce
nearly any individual into crime even without using crimes that most
individuals would commit. When states enforced a large set of sex
200 See supra Part III.A.
201 State v. Lively, 921 P.2d 1035, 1035 (Wash. 1996).
202 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 369 (1958).
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crimes-against fornication, adultery, prostitution, statutory rape, sodomy,
obscenity, and contraception-this was a plausible scenario. I am less
certain whether it remains plausible today, though it might. For example,
with the proliferation of regulatory offenses, police may be able to induce
most members of a given industry or occupation to commit crimes
concerning that industry or occupation.20 3
In any event, I seek only to show that the strength of the political
rationale for regulating undercover operations varies by crime. The same is
true of the economic rationale. Initially, to turn the point around, the
economic justification for undercover operations varies by crime. There is
a greater law enforcement need to use sting operations or any effective
tactic for serious crimes (e.g., terrorism) than for less serious crimes (e.g.,
pick-pocketing). Holding severity of crime constant, there is also a greater
need for the undercover tactic to investigate crimes that tend not to generate
complaints from victims and witnesses (e.g., bribery and drug sales) than
for crimes that tend to generate such complaints (e.g., burglary and assault).
Where there is great need for undercover tactics, the entrapment defense is
more costly.
Holding constant the law enforcement need, the efficiency of particular
undercover operations depends on several factors, the primary one being the
elasticity of demand for certain crimes.204 If raising the net benefits for
crime by ten percent greatly increases the number of individuals willing to
offend, then the demand is (at this point) highly elastic; if raising the net
benefits by the same amount has almost no effect on the number of
individuals willing to offend, then the demand is highly inelastic. Highly
(in)elastic demand means that there is greater (lower) risk of apprehending
low-risk offenders. To illustrate, consider the category of true non-
offenders-individuals who decline to offend in the undercover operation
and will not offend with any probability outside the undercover operation.
Other things equal, the greater the proportion of true non-offenders in the
population, the less the need for judicial regulation. If almost everyone is a
true non-offender, then there is a natural limit to the possible wastefulness
of an undercover operation. For example, police cannot tempt more than a
very few into crimes involving sex with young children. There remains a
risk of apprehending low-value offenders-pedophiles who would
otherwise probably resist acting on their sexual desires (e.g., possibly
203 In particular, there are many criminal statutes regulating the "occupation" of
politicians. There may be some political danger that officials could target politicians they
oppose with undercover operations involving technical violations of campaign finance and
gift regulations.
204 See Goff& Tollison, supra note 96, at 40.
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Jacobson 205)-but the risk is necessarily smaller than for criminal
opportunities that tempt a larger part of the population. By contrast, when
almost everyone would commit the crime under circumstances that may
occur, as might be true of the tempting crimes listed above (failure to return
lost property, copyright violations, illegal distribution of marijuana for
medicinal purposes, etc.), then there are few, if any, true non-offenders.
Here, the economic need for judicial regulation is greatest.
Second, holding constant the law enforcement need and the elasticity
of demand, the efficiency of undercover operations depends on the
proportion of a given crime committed by recidivists. The greater the
amount of external crime committed by ongoing offenders, the lower the
productivity of apprehending probabilistic offenders and the greater the
need for judicial regulation. Some crimes-e.g., arson-for-hire,
counterfeiting, money laundering-are probably committed almost entirely
by recidivist professionals, that is, true offenders. Other crimes or criminal
contexts-e.g., accepting an unsolicited bribe, embezzlement, statutory
rape-might be opportunistic, that is, committed mostly by probabilistic
offenders who encounter scarce criminal opportunities. If recidivists
commit most of the crimes, then there is a sharp drop-off in the social
returns of punishment as one moves from a true offender to a probabilistic
offender, and therefore a greater benefit from a doctrine that minimizes the
punishment of anyone but true offenders. By contrast, if most crimes of a
certain sort are committed by non-recidivist, probabilistic offenders, then
their punishment is more productive. In general, for recidivist/professional
(opportunistic) crimes, there is a sharp (shallow) drop-off in the social
returns of punishment as one moves from true to high-risk to low-risk
probabilistic offenders and therefore a greater (lesser) return from an
entrapment defense that makes fine-grained distinctions between the
temptations the government offered in the undercover operation.
Finally, holding constant the above variables, the ideal judicial
regulation depends on whether the undercover operation occurs in a "thick"
or "thin" criminal market. The best regulation will define a permissible
range of undercover offers based on the offers that exist in the external
criminal market. If the external criminal market involves lots of
transactions per time period-e.g., illegal drugs or gun sales-it will be
relatively easy to identify the prices and quantities at which trades typically
occur. By contrast, in a thin criminal market--e.g., judicial bribery-it will
be much more costly to identify the standard rate for such transactions. The
permissible range of undercover offers should depend on how costly it is to
205 503 U.S. 540 (1992), discussed supra in Part I.
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identify the external range of criminal opportunities. One might also want
to allocate the burden of proof in undercover cases with this cost in mind.
I previously proposed a thought experiment in which undercover
operations are forbidden except where the legislature explicitly authorizes
them. To ensure that the undercover operations it authorizes are productive,
the legislature would either state the narrow conditions under which it
granted undercover authority to police or grant them general undercover
authority while defining the conditions of an exception in which
prosecution is barred. If, counter-factually, the legislature granted
authorization only under specified conditions, the present point is that those
conditions should vary crime by crime. If, closer to reality, the legislature
grants general undercover authority subject to exceptions, those exceptions
should vary by crime. Given the American approach, the entrapment
defense should be defined for each crime for which police are authorized to
use undercover operations.
Implementing this crime-specific solution is complex and intensely
empirical. Given space limitations, I only briefly illustrate what a tailored
analysis might entail. First, some crimes or specific temptations might
threaten the political rationale because they would tempt such a large part of
the population. An example of such a crime might be a copyright violation,
the failure to return lost or misdirected property, or the knowing sale of
legal goods in exchange for drug proceeds.2 °6 Even when a particular crime
is not tempting to most individuals, a particular kind of temptation might
make it so, as where a person is asked to procure an illegal drug for
someone who apparently will use it to alleviate her suffering (as in
Sherman) or in order to maintain a romantic relationship (as in Lively).
Indeed, even if the criminal opportunity is not usually tempting to a great
many people, the government might be able induce most people if it offers
the opportunity repeatedly (on separate occasions) or times the
opportunities to coincide with periods of temporary vulnerability, such as
bankruptcy or intoxication. The tailoring approach might therefore prohibit
any convictions based on undercover operations for these crimes, offering
these specific kinds of temptations, or timing temptations in these specific
ways.
Where the political rationale is not at issue, the economic analysis
differs by crime. Consider arson-for-hire and money laundering for drug
sellers (which probably tempt only a small part of the population and
therefore do not pose the political concern). To begin, these are serious
206 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956, at issue in United States v. Jensen, 69 F.3d 906 (8th Cir.




crimes that pose difficulties for conventional investigative tools (because
frequently the only witnesses are perpetrators). I do not know what the
elasticity of demand is, but I agree with the implicit assumption of Judge
Posner's Hollingsworth opinion20 7 that money laundering presents real
potential for luring (what I have termed) low-risk probabilistic offenders
who are exceedingly unlikely to offend externally. Moreover, it seems
highly likely that most arson-for-hire and money laundering crimes are
committed by recidivist professionals, so there is a substantial risk that
apprehending probabilistic offenders is wasteful. Finally, there appears to
be a fairly thick market for these services, so that it would not be too costly
for the government to determine what the ordinary market opportunities are.
Given these factors, it seems sensible to permit undercover operations for
these crimes but to condition conviction stringently on the government's
proving that it offered only ordinary market opportunities.
By contrast, consider judicial bribery. This too is a serious crime for
which conventional investigative tools are limited. The elasticity of
demand is an intensely empirical question, but I would guess that it is
relatively inelastic-that almost any judge who would refuse the ordinary
bribe would also refuse a bribe that was ten percent larger. Indeed, I would
guess that most judges who would reject a standard bribe offer would reject
one ten times as large. Moreover, although there are some jurisdictions
where bribes are expected and paid in almost every case, I imagine that
there are a great many American jurisdictions in which judicial bribe offers
are rare. In these cases, bribe-taking is an "opportunistic" crime, meaning
most of the crimes are committed by individuals who do not offend in a
given time period. Finally, at least in such jurisdictions, the market for
bribes is thin and therefore it is costly for the government to prove that it
has offered only a standard bribe. Given these factors, it seems imperative
to run undercover operations for this crime and appropriate to condition
conviction only loosely on whether the offer was the kind of opportunity
that occasionally occurs in the real world (perhaps by putting the burden on
the defendant to prove otherwise). Of course, this regulation could still be
conditioned on the limitations described above that forbid, for example, the
government's leveraging romantic relationships, as when a lover offers the
bribe.
As a final example, consider decoy operations that offer attractive
victims for pickpockets (as where undercover agents pose as being passed
out drunk with cash hanging from a pocket). 20 8 Relatively speaking, pick-
pocketing is not a serious offense. And because there are often witnesses to
207 27 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc), discussed supra Part I.
208 See, e.g., the Nevada line of cases, supra note 38.
[Vol. 96
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENTRAPMENT
this crime other than perpetrators-particularly, victims-there is no reason
to discount the effectiveness of conventional investigative techniques. I
would guess that the demand is relatively elastic in the sense that there are
many people who would not pick-pocket in conditions of an ordinary
probability of detection but would do so when the probability appears much
lower because there is an isolated and unconscious victim. Finally, I would
guess that most pick-pocketing is done by professional recidivists. The
market for this crime may be thin, but because the police are using a decoy
rather than a sting, they are likely to have easy access to the relevant
information: the characteristics of actual victims of the crime. Given these
factors, these decoy operations seem presumptively wasteful, as if police
tired of chasing the professionals and sought some cheap and easy arrests.
For this crime, we might want to ban such operations entirely or permit
them only when the government can demonstrate that the undercover decoy
victim closely mimicked the actual victims of recent crimes in the same
area (as an elderly woman walking alone through a park).
This discussion only illustrates the kind of tailored analysis that best
serves the political and economic rationales for an entrapment defense.
Though tentative, the examples help to show why intuitions about
entrapment swing wildly from one crime to another. Given the very
different levels of scrutiny appropriate to different contexts, it is no wonder
that there is difficulty achieving consensus on a one-size-fits-all entrapment
defense. Nonetheless, it is to this conventional approach I now turn.
B. REFORMULATING THE CONVENTIONAL APPROACH: AN IMPROVED
UNITARY ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE
The conventional entrapment defense is unitary-one size fits all
crimes. This approach is necessarily second best, being too broad in some
circumstances and too narrow in others. To construct the best unitary
defense given the economic and political rationales, I separately discuss the
appropriate doctrine for each rationale, and then propose the best defense
given both. I also compare my proposed unitary defense to the existing
formulations.
As a preliminary matter, recall that the normative analysis above
applies only to pro-active undercover operations, by which I mean those
where government manipulates criminal opportunities to make them appear
more favorable. 20 9  When the government does not manipulate
opportunities, but only infiltrates and passively observes, the political and
209 Covert agents manipulate opportunities either by posing as a confederate to the
crime-a "sting"-or by posing as a potential victim-a "decoy."
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economic rationales require no defense. Recall also that I assumed that the
pre-existing literature justified a minimalist defense that prohibited the
government from creating criminal opportunities better than any that exist
in the real world. The question is what more to require.
1. Formulating an Entrapment Defense to Prevent Political Abuse
We might solve the problem of political misuse of undercover
operations by inquiring into the motives of the officials who directed the
operation or the resulting prosecution. Once we ruled out improper
motivation-no official targeted an enemy or scapegoat-there would be no
political rationale for a defense. Because intent is easily concealed,
however, the doctrine of selective prosecution is notoriously ineffective.21 °
It appears more promising to base a test on objective facts, identifying
situations where discretion is most easily abused rather than proof that it
was abused in the particular case. That approach is consistent with other
institutional side-constraints on criminal law enforcement (e.g., the
vagueness doctrine and most Fourth Amendment law).
The objective factors that make undercover operations politically
dangerous are (1) the scarcity of criminal opportunities and (2) the
repetition and/or calculated timing of offers. Most obviously, there is a risk
of political abuse when the opportunities offered are so scarce that they
would tempt a large majority of people. Existing formulations of the
objective test address this factor reasonably well by asking whether the
undercover inducement would be likely to tempt an "average" or "normally
21law-abiding" person. Of course, to answer this question adequately, one
must consider all the dimensions by which the offer may be scarce, as
discussed above.2t2 Existing formulations of the subjective test also provide
some protection against political abuse. Even though predisposition is
fairly easily proved, the defense creates some risk that anyone targeted for
political reasons will gain an acquittal, after which their claim to be the
victim of a political vendetta may be credible.
Less obvious is the danger posed by the repetition of offers or the
timing of offers during a moment of predictable but temporary weakness
(e.g., intoxication, bankruptcy, or emotional distress). Repetition and
timing intensify the problem of scarce opportunities. If the criminal
opportunity is abundant-as it is in some places for the crimes of soliciting
prostitution or buying cocaine-then police repetition and timing don't
210 See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 176.
211 See supra Part I.
212 See supra Part III.A. 1.
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matter much (because citizens are constantly tempted anyway). But, as
explained above, a somewhat scarce offer is far more likely to induce
criminality when it is repeated or deliberately timed. Existing formulations
of the subjective test address the repetition factor indirectly by asking
whether the individual was immediately willing to offend. Jurisdictions
employing the subjective test may do a better job of attending to these facts
than those employing the objective test. But the ultimate issue properly
framed is not subjective; it is whether the government engaged in repeated
or timed targeting of scarce offers in a way that would make them tempting
to most individuals.
Thus, the political rationale points to a defense that limits the criminal
opportunities police can create to those that would not, even when repeated
or timed as the police did in the particular case, induce most citizens to
offend. Because the best approach tailors the defense to the crime, this
unitary test is, of course, under- and overinclusive. It is underinclusive if
government officials can readily ascertain any individual's "weakness" and
match it to a particular offense, in which case they could induce nearly
anyone into crime even without using crimes that most individuals would
commit. It is overinclusive if there is a certain crime nearly everyone
commits and yet there is an evenhanded effort to enforce the law. An
example is corruption. Suppose there is a jurisdiction in which virtually
every public official takes bribes and virtually every private citizen gives
bribes. If the jurisdiction is ever to move from the high corruption
equilibrium to a low corruption equilibrium, it may require undercover
operations that offer inducements everyone will (initially) accept.2 13
Notwithstanding these problems, if we seek a unitary test, then the one just
described is the best I can imagine for solving the political problem of
undercover operations.
2. Formulating An Entrapment Defense to Avoid Wasteful Law
Enforcement
Given their motivation, police will prefer undercover tactics that yield
high numbers of low-value arrests to tactics that yield low numbers of high-
value arrests. More precisely, the above analysis identified two ways in
which the structure of undercover operations can be wasteful. First,
operations that create highly scarce criminal opportunities will apprehend
many low-risk probabilistic and false offenders. Second, the false positive
paradox analysis revealed that even more moderate temptations (with low
false positive rates) will, if offered randomly, apprehend mostly low value
213 1 thank Susan Rose-Ackerman for bringing this example to my attention.
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offenders. How should we formulate a unitary doctrine to address these
problems?
For the most part, solving the first problem solves the second. If
undercover tactics are somewhat costly to police and police can lawfully
create only modestly attractive criminal opportunities, they will usually
choose not to offer them randomly. Given that most people will refuse
modest inducements, random selection is costly for police because it
requires a great many operations to produce one arrest. Thus, if the
entrapment defense limits the attractiveness of criminal opportunities, the
police will usually have an incentive to target only those individuals whom
they already reasonably suspect of offending. So the best unitary defense
should primarily limit the inducements the police can offer.
To some extent, the subjective and objective entrapment rules already
give some incentive to police to limit the attractiveness of the criminal
opportunities they create. The objective test does so directly, though some
jurisdictions set the bar very high-proscribing only those inducements that
would tempt an ordinary or law-abiding citizen. One might imagine that
there are some temptations to crime large enough to lure some false or low-
risk individuals to offend but still small enough not to lure most people to
offend. The subjective test limits the inducements indirectly, because the
fact-finder is less likely to view the defendant as predisposed if the only
evidence is immediate willingness to accept an extremely scarce and
attractive criminal opportunity. Here, I consider how to improve on the
existing approaches.
a. Defining the Safe Harbor of Ordinary and Average Inducements
What rule defines the optimal limits to criminal temptations, given the
constraints created by a unitary definition of entrapment? The right starting
point is the proposal by Ron Allen, Melissa Luttrell, and Anne Kreeger
("ALK") to grant an entrapment defense if "the inducements exceeded real
world market rates."'214 Though market rates may seem necessarily correct,
the best unitary solution might be something else, depending on the
tradeoffs in false positives and false negatives. On the one hand, perhaps
most people do not even know what the profit margins are for various
crimes and will never find out. A sting operation at market rates might then
cause them to learn of the possible profit margins for the first time and then
to commit crime internally they would never have committed externally. If
so, the ideal entrapment test might require slightly below-average market
214 Allen, Luttrell, & Kreeger, supra note 77, at 415.
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inducements to raise the probability that any offender is high-value.215 On
the other hand, it might be the case that almost anyone who refuses to
commit a crime at the prevailing market rate would also refuse to commit
the crime at a price that is twenty percent better than the market rate. If so,
the ideal unitary test would allow slightly above-market rates because such
operations decrease false negatives far more than they increase false
positives. In the end, it is difficult to evaluate these offsetting arguments
with available information, so the ALK proposal seems like the right
starting point. Under that proposal, if police stick to market limits, there is
no need for additional evidence that the defendant offends externally.
There is no further inquiry into "predisposition."
There is, however, an ambiguity in the ALK proposal: whether the
government is permitted to offer any real world market rates or only
ordinary or average market rates. The former possibility-permitting the
police to offer even the rarest real world criminal opportunity found in the
market-is the same as the "minimal" entrapment defense I argued against.
The alternative interpretation-to permit the police to offer only ordinary
and average criminal opportunities-better serves the economic rationale
(and is probably what ALK intend). But the normative analysis above
suggests the need for two modifications, giving greater clarity to what is
meant by ordinary or average.
First, I use the term "ordinary" in addition to "average" because we
need to consider not only how a criminal offer's magnitude compares to the
magnitude of other such real world offers, but how frequently such offers
occur. The economic rationale raises greater concerns when the
215 One might also want to require below-market prices to offset certain activity-level
effects of undercover operations. First, when a target refuses an undercover criminal
opportunity, it is possible that the operation causes her to revise downward her estimate of
the probability of detection. For example, when a target receives an offer to launder money
through her commercial enterprise, the undercover agent's willingness to propose the crime
may make it seem that it is more common and harder to detect than she previously believed.
Thus, it is possible that an undercover offer she refuses might nonetheless make her more
likely to offend externally in the future, if her circumstances change (such as having her
lawful opportunities contract). Second, undercover operations cause criminal organizations
to test the loyalty of potential members by demanding that they commit a crime, thus
demonstrating that they are not undercover operatives. An increase in undercover operations
might increase the number or severity of the "loyalty" crimes committed. Because these two
activity level effects occur in response to the number of undercover operations, rather than
their structure, an entrapment defense is not generally useful for addressing them.
Nonetheless, one might effectively "tax" undercover operations by limiting the police to
offering below-market prices, which would lower the effectiveness of the operations and
thereby lower the number of times police use them. If one can solve the agency problems,




government is offering scarce rather than standard, readily-available
opportunities. The more scarce the opportunity, the greater the chance that
government is wasting law enforcement resources. The police should be
permitted the "safe harbor" of creating ordinary and average criminal
opportunities. The fact-finder's determination whether the offer was
ordinary should focus on all relevant dimensions: the material gain from the
crime, the non-material gain (e.g., maintaining personal or romantic
relationships), the probability of detection, the apparent moral
rationalization for offending, etc.216
There is a second important nuance to determining ordinary
opportunities. For many markets, the quality of the illegal good or service
varies and criminal buyers will therefore not offer the same price to every
seller. If one wishes to avoid waste, the police must offer to an individual
no more than the price she can obtain in the market, given the quality of
good or service she can provide. An example is arson-for-hire. When a
building owner wants to bum his building in order to collect insurance, she
seeks a professional arsonist who will make the fire look accidental. She
will not offer the price the professional charges, nor possibly any price, to
an amateur who lacks the necessary knowledge, skills, and reputation. The
price that is "average and ordinary" for an arsonist is not "average and
ordinary" for anyone else. If police offer a random homeless person $1,000
to burn a building, that is entrapment even if the average arsonist charges
$1,000. The police should offer no more than what the defendant could
obtain in the criminal market given her skill and reputation.
217
To decide this issue, the fact-finder must consider evidence currently
relevant only under the subjective test concerning the defendant's
knowledge, skill, and reputation for committing the crime in question. The
evidence is being used differently here-the focus is whether the
opportunity the police created is ordinary, not whether the defendant is
predisposed. To some degree, this inquiry requires some costly defendant-
216 There is a potential problem applying this test in a thin market: even if the police
create an average criminal opportunity, it may be that any opportunity is rare because they
occur so infrequently. If there is one bribe offered per year and its size is $5,000, then
$5,000 is average, but it is scarce rather than ordinary. Nonetheless, I propose that the police
always be allowed to make an offer, even if the fact of the offer is scarce. The "ordinary"
standard then requires that all other variables are ordinary in addition to average.
217 One can read United States v. Hollingsworth to introduce exactly this consideration
within the subjective test by defining predisposition to include "readiness." Readiness may
mean that one possesses the skill or reputation needed to attract the offered price. 27 F.3d
1196 (7th Cir. 1994). Money laundering is a service where quality matters and the court
essentially found that the defendants were offered the "going rate" for a service they lacked
the skill to provide.
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by-defendant analysis. Nonetheless, asking about the defendant's
specialized knowledge and skills, or reputation, are far less speculative and
difficult than asking whether the defendant offends externally.
218
b. Requiring Prior Suspicion for Extraordinary Inducements
ALK strictly limit the police to market level inducements. Although
"average and ordinary" inducements should be a "safe harbor" for law
enforcement, I do not believe the right normative analysis rules out offering
anything more. Offering ordinary opportunities necessarily generates false
negatives, as some individuals will turn down the undercover offer of an
ordinary opportunity even though they are at high risk to accept
extraordinary opportunities that will come their way. One wants to permit
the state to offer extraordinary opportunities, but somehow to minimize the
number of false or low-risk offenders who are apprehended.
I see no way to prove that one imperfect unitary solution here is better
than another. My suggestion, however, is to permit extraordinary
inducements, but only based on prior suspicion of external offending. So,
the police have the choice of (1) creating ordinary criminal opportunities
without any proof of prior suspicion nor any subsequent proof of
predisposition, or (2) creating extraordinary criminal opportunities (not so
great as to threaten the political rationale) based on some prior suspicion of
the targeted individual. I will go a step further and recommend that the
evidence for prior suspicion be independently evaluated prior to the
undercover operation. A familiar means of implementing these suggestions
would be via concepts in Fourth Amendment law-reasonable suspicion219
and a warrant220-though there might be other doctrinal vehicles.
218 In any event, this entire inquiry is not necessary in many undercover operations. In a
"thick" black market for drugs or firearms, every seller may command the standard price.
Similarly, for bribery, the only special "skill" the prosecutor needs to prove is that the
defendant is a public official who can bestow official favors.
219 The standard is elaborated in the progeny of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Others
have recommended that "reasonable suspicion" be required for all undercover operations,
whether or not the inducement is ordinary. See, e.g., Maura Whelan, Lead Us Not into
(Unwarranted) Temptation: A Proposal to Replace the Entrapment Defense with a
Reasonable Suspicion Requirement, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 1193 (1985) and the panel opinion in
United States v. Jacobson, 893 F.2d 999, 1000 (8th Cir. 1990) ("[T]he government must
have reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts before initiating an undercover
operation .... ), vacated 916 F.2d 467 (en banc) (1990). For criticism of this proposal, see
Philip B. Heymann, Understanding Criminal Investigations, 22 HARV. J. LEGIS. 315, 330-34
(1985).
220 Obviously, warrants authorizing searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment
require probable cause, whereas investigatory stops, frisks, and other measures requiring
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Here are the reasons for thinking that a prior suspicion standard is the
best unitary regulation of those undercover operations that stray beyond
ordinary and average inducements. First, we have to worry that the creation
of extraordinary criminal opportunities will cause false or low risk
individuals to offend. This problem is particularly acute if we relieve the
government of providing any additional information that the defendant
offends externally (as I propose for ordinary and average inducements).
Recall the prior discussion of the false positive paradox. 221 I gave an
example where the police randomly targeted individuals where the base rate
of crime was one in a thousand and showed that, even with a low false
positive rate (5%), most internal offenders were false offenders. Once we
permit the police to offer scarce, extraordinary criminal opportunities, we
not only increase the false positive rate, but also increase the incentive for
the police to engage in random targeting. That is, the police will sometimes
expect such low returns from randomly selecting targets for ordinary
inducements that they will choose on their own to target only those for
whom they have reasonable suspicion. But because extraordinary
inducements increase the expected yield of arrests, the police might no
longer seek suspicion on their own, even though it is more important given
the expected increase in the false positive rate. Hence, I propose requiring
advanced suspicion in this circumstance.
Second, the purpose of a warrant or other ex ante independent
review 222 is to avoid the excessive deference that is likely to occur once it is
known that the suspect offended in the undercover operation. A hindsight
"bias" could be purely political-it is more costly for a government official
to decide after the undercover offense that the police lacked appropriate
suspicion because the public is then more likely to object that the official is
"letting the guilty go free." There is also the well established possibility of
a cognitive hindsight bias.223 To this I would add the "fundamental
attribution error," a cognitive bias once described as "the most robust and
reasonable suspicion require no warrant. But as the Fourth Amendment does not itself
constrain undercover operations, I am free to borrow its elements in this novel manner.
221 See supra Part II.B.2.a.
222 The Department of Justice has an Undercover Review Committee that must approve
F.B.I. undercover operations involving certain "sensitive circumstances," such as the
targeting of a government official. See AG Guidelines, supra note 39. Although some
prosecutorial committees of this sort would operate as rubber stamps, that is neither a
necessary outcome nor necessarily different than the behavior of some magistrates in
approving warrants.
223 See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in
Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 571 (1998); Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately
Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (2005).
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repeatable finding in social psychology. 224 People tend to attribute the
behavior of another to her preferences or attitudes to a greater degree than is
logically warranted, and conversely, to under-attribute another's behavior to
her situational constraints. 225 Thus, after the target has offended in the
undercover operation, fact-finders will tend to over-attribute that behavior
to the person's willingness to offend rather than the undercover temptation.
If so, then believing the defendant is predisposed to commit this kind of
offense would seem to make the hindsight bias more likely in judging
whether the prior suspicion the police had was sufficient. It is not just that
the basis of the police officers' prior suspicion seems to have correctly
predicted the defendant's behavior in the undercover operation, but that it
seems to have correctly predicted what kind of person the defendant is.
Finally, note what this heightened standard still permits. Even if the
police target individuals with extraordinary criminal opportunities without
prior suspicion, the state always remains free to charge the defendant with
external offenses. Undercover offending will almost always create probable
cause to believe the individual offends externally, which would justify
searches for evidence of external crimes.226 Often, the target who agrees to
sell illegal drugs or weapons in an undercover operation has a car trunk or
basement full of contraband. With this evidence, the state can prove
external crimes and has no great need to punish for internal ones. So the
question is what to do when there was no reason to suspect the target before
the undercover operation, the police create extraordinary opportunities, and
the evidence acquired after the operations fails to prove an external offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. I suggest that the entrapment defense then bar
conviction for the internal offense.
224 E. E. JONES, INTERPERSONAL PERCEPTION 138 (1990). See also Miller, D. T. & D. A.
Prentice, The Construction of Social Norms and Standards, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY:
HANDBOOK OF BASIC PRINCIPLES 799, 803 (E. T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski eds., 1996)
(emphasizing the "enormous support" the finding has received in varied settings over three
decades of research).
225 "When people observe behavior, they often conclude that the person who performed
the behavior was predisposed to do so-that the person's behavior corresponds to the
person's unique dispositions-and they draw such conclusions even when a logical analysis
suggests they should not." D.T. Gilbert & P. S. Malone, The Correspondence Bias, 117
PSYCH. BULL. 21 (1995) (emphasis added).
226 See Labensky v. County of Nassau, 6 F. Supp. 2d 161 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). Even though
the prosecutor ultimately dismissed the indictment because of the strength of the entrapment
defense, the court found probable cause for arrest and dismissed claims for false arrest and
false imprisonment. Id. at 177; cf Jacqueline E. Ross, Valuing inside Knowledge: Police
Infiltration as a Problem for the Law of Evidence, 79 CHI-KENT L.REv. 1111 (2004).
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3. A Proposed Entrapment Test Given Both Rationales
When we combine the above analysis to create a defense that serves
both the political and economic functions, the result is the following test.
First, the threshold that triggers the defense is a proactive operation in
which government manipulated the apparent criminal opportunities (not
mere passive observation). Second, an actor who offends in a proactive
undercover operation is entitled to a defense (or to have the conviction
enjoined or evidence excluded) if the undercover opportunity, by virtue of
its scarcity, repetition, and/or timing, is more than otherwise ever exists
externally (the minimalist test) or would tempt a majority of individuals
(the political concern). Third, an actor is also entitled to a defense, even
though the opportunity exists externally and would not tempt most
individuals, if (a) the opportunity was not ordinary and average and (b)
prior to the operation, no judicial officer (or other appropriate official)
found that the police had reasonable suspicion to believe the defendant had
committed or was committing the same sort of offense.227 In the margin, I
228
offer statutory language that could implement this three-part test.
227 After first drafting this proposal, I discovered a similar approach in the Attorney
General Guidelines that govern F.B.I. undercover operations. See AG Guidelines, supra note
39. Section V.B(4) requires that
[o]ne of the following limitations is met:
(i) There is a reasonable indication that the subject is engaging, has engaged, or is likely to
engage in the illegal activity proposed or in similar illegal conduct; or
(ii) The opportunity for illegal activity has been structured so that there is reason to believe that
any persons drawn to the opportunity, or brought to it, are predisposed to engage in the
contemplated illegal conduct.
Id. at 16. The "reasonable indication" requirement of paragraph (i) is obviously similar to
my proposal for "reasonable suspicion." Though there is no mention here of proving that
suspicion to a magistrate or other independent body prior to the undercover operation, it is
worth noting that there are some "sensitive circumstances" (such as the targeting of
government officials) in which the AG Guidelines require advanced approval by an
Undercover Review Committee staffed in part by DOJ attorneys (who presumably are not
personally prosecuting the individuals apprehended in undercover operations they approve).
Id. at 6-8. Paragraph (ii) says nothing about how one ascertains that the undercover
operation is "structured" to attract only the predisposed, but one can view my proposal as
providing the relevant detail by requiring that the criminal opportunity be "ordinary and
average." Because the OIG's REPORT, supra note 37, does not review compliance with this
provision, I do not know whether the F.B.I. complies with it; in any event, paragraph (ii) is
currently too vague. But the formulation in the alternative-individualized suspicion or a
sufficiently structured opportunity-supports the basic approach I advocate.
228
Entrapment is an affirmative defense. A public law enforcement official or an agent acting in
cooperation with such an official perpetrates an entrapment if, in an undercover operation for the
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Note that I am intentionally hedging on the all-important question of
the burden of proof. There is nothing in the theory that gives a definite
answer to whom should bear the burden of proving some or all of the
elements of the defense. This is exactly the sort of issue that cries out for
crime-by-crime analysis, if only to consider the severity of the crime. One
might be more inclined, for example, to put the burden on the defendant in
a terrorism or bribery case than in a prostitution or pick-pocketing case. In
any event, I leave this matter unresolved and focus on what the elements are
rather than who must prove them.
We can now also see what is wrong with other approaches. First, the
subjective test does not sufficiently protect against the political threat or
economic waste. If the defendant accepts the offer on the first opportunity,
she will likely lose the defense even if its scarcity would tempt most of the
population. If the offer is not tempting to most but still extraordinary, she
will lose the defense by failing to resist the offer sufficiently, even if the
police wasted resources by randomly targeting with no pre-existing
suspicion. Second, for the same reason, the objective test in some
jurisdictions does not sufficiently protect against economic waste: the
police are allowed to offer an extraordinary opportunities randomly, as long
as they would not tempt most law abiding citizens. Finally, some
commentators and courts have proposed requiring reasonable suspicion for
all undercover operations. 229  But where the government offers merely
"ordinary and average" opportunities, there is no reason to require prior
suspicion. The ordinary should remain a safe harbor.
To illustrate how the test works, consider two cases. The defense
would bar criminal liability in Lively.230 There is a reasonable argument
purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of an offense, he creates apparent criminal
opportunities that an actor accepts, and:
(1) the apparent criminal opportunities were greater than any occurring outside of undercover
operations; or
(2) when considering the number of times the opportunity was made apparent to the actor, the
apparent criminal opportunities would tempt most ordinarily law-abiding citizens into offending;
or
(3) the criminal opportunities were made apparent during a foreseeable, infrequent, and
temporary interval in which the actor lacked the substantial capacity to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law; or
(4) the apparent criminal opportunities were greater than ordinary and average given the actor's
knowledge, skill, and reputation, and were made apparent to the actor before the official
demonstrated to a magistrate that he had reasonable suspicion that the actor had committed
similar offenses.
229 See, e.g., Whelan, supra note 219.
230 State v. Lively, 921 P.2d 1035 (Wash. 1996).
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that the government created circumstances and timed the opportunities in
such a way that a majority of citizens would commit this crime-selling
small quantities of cocaine, soon after attempting suicide, to a friend of a
lover for no profit in order to preserve the romantic relationship. But
putting aside that point, the opportunity was clearly extraordinary-given
the relationship the government agent created-while the police had no
prior suspicion of Lively to justify their actions. In the terrorism case of
Lakhani T3 it is clear that most people would not, under any circumstances
short of considerable duress, agree to sell missiles to a terrorist intent on
shooting down civilian planes. It is also clear, however, that the
government created an extraordinary opportunity by offering a large profit
for the sale, waiting patiently for a year during which Lakhani failed to
acquire the weapon, and then arranging for another government to supply
Lakhani the armaments he could not acquire. The issue would then turn on
whether the government reasonably suspected Lakhani to begin with, a
point on which they would probably win. Perhaps the legality of a terrorist
operation should not depend on such matters, given the stakes, but any one-
size-fits-all defense will fail to accommodate the special interests of
particular investigations.
CONCLUSION
This article offers new perspectives on the justifications for the
entrapment defense. The central idea is that the defense regulates proactive
undercover operations by which police manipulate the appearance of
criminal opportunities. To date, no one has offered a persuasive rationale
for the defense based on retributive theory or an institutional concern for
fairness. I am doubtful such a theory is workable. By contrast, though I
criticize the existing political and economic theories, I reconstruct them to
justify the defense. The political rationale arises from the ability of
undercover operations to manipulate the fortuity of legal compliance. As a
result there is an institutional need to limit the power of government
officials who control undercover operations, to prevent them from being
able to target political enemies or unpopular scapegoats. The economic
rationale arises from the need to correct the principal-agent problem that
drives police to prefer undercover tactics that yield high numbers of low-
value arrests to tactics that yield low numbers of high-value arrests. We
avoid the waste of scarce law enforcement resources by a defense that re-
orients police motivation, ensuring that internal offending remains
sufficiently correlated with external offending. These rationales point to the
231 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
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desirability of tailoring a specific entrapment defense to each crime, but I
also describe a unitary entrapment defense that will best serve the functions
of the defense.
186 RICHARD H MCADAMS [Vol. 96
